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Introduction
Governments of developed states perceive their societies as vulnerable to
the fallout from an increasingly brutal and chaotic world. They are aware
that ready access to international travel carries the risk of importing politi-
cal and other violence from even quite distant countries, and believe that
they have a fundamental responsibility to do what they can to establish
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zones of safety and security for their own people.' To this end, govern-
ments have amended immigration laws to bar the entry of broad categories
of potentially threatening outsiders.2
The stringency of these measures, however, is challenged by the simul-
taneous need to honor duties under international refugee law. Refugees
are entitled to enter an asylum country without its authorization 3 and may
not ordinarily be sent away without careful investigation of their need for
protection. 4 State parties to the Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (Refugee Convention or Convention) are therefore bound to temper
the scope of exclusionary efforts to ensure that the protection claims of
refugees are not ignored. To the growing frustration of a number of govern-
ments, this obligation means that any screen on the entry of noncitizens
must incorporate an exception for persons who claim to be at risk of perse-
cution in their country of origin. Even persons believed to have engaged in
serious acts of violence must not be summarily expelled if they advance an
arguable claim to refugee status. 5
1. For example, the European Union has formally committed itself "to maintain
and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free
movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect
to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of
crime." TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, art. 2, Oct. 2, 1997,
OJ. (C 340) 1, 12 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM].
2. One of the truly ironic results of the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, a terrorist
act with no foreign connections, was that it led to the enactment of unprecedented
restrictions on the admission of noncitizens to the United States. As President Clinton
conceded when signing the anti-terrorist legislation into law, "[tihis bill also makes a
number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do with
fighting terrorism." Statement on the Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630, 632 (1996).
3. A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as
he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur
prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined. Recogni-
tion of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him
to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recog-
nized because he is a refugee.
OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 1 28, at 9 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
4. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, done July, 28, 1951, arts. 31-33,
189 U.N.T.S. 150, 174-76 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. Refugee Convention duties
are incorporated by reference in the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan.
31, 1967, art.1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268-70.
5. The British Home Secretary expressed his frustration when asylum claims were
lodged by persons aboard the hijacked Afghan aircraft that landed in the United King-
dom in February 2000.
I made it clear in my statement last Thursday and in subsequent comments that
asylum applications are judged in accordance with the law-the 1951 [Refugee
Convention] as it has been interpreted by statutes here and decisions of the
courts-but I wish also to make it clear that the hijack presents us with a clash
of obligations. We have obligations under the 1951 convention; we also have
clear obligations under international law, which the British public plainly sup-
port, to ensure that we take the strongest possible measures to prevent and deter
the international terrorist crime of hijacking.
344 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2000) 595 (statement of Mr. Straw).
Vol. 34
2001 Framing Refugee Protection
A number of jurisdictions have fastened onto a "solution" that appears
to reconcile respect for refugee law with the determination of states to rid
themselves quickly of potentially violent asylum seekers. Courts in these
states have been persuaded that a person who has committed or facilitated
acts of violence may lawfully be denied a refugee status hearing under a
clause of the Refugee Convention that authorizes the automatic exclusion
of persons whom the government reasonably believes are international or
extraditable criminals. Refugee law so interpreted is reconcilable with even
fairly blunt measures for the exclusion of violent asylum seekers.
In our view, this approach is doctrinally unsound and rife with critical
risks for genuine refugees. The Refugee Convention as originally con-
ceived fairly meets the legitimate needs of both refugees and the communi-
ties that receive them. Refugee law does not ignore the security interests of
asylum countries, but refuses to allow those interests to run roughshod
over the equally urgent need of persons at risk of persecution to secure
entry to a place of safety.
Two parts of the Refugee Convention are relevant. The mechanism
now increasingly invoked to justify bars on the entry of asylum seekers
associated with acts of violence is Article 1(F). 6 This clause requires gov-
ernments to deny refugee status to any person reasonably regarded as
either an international criminal or a fugitive from domestic criminal jus-
tice, the person's fear of persecution notwithstanding. As elaborated
below, this mechanism for "peremptory exclusion" is predicated on the sat-
isfaction of an external and clearly defined standard of international or
extraditable criminality. Only persons who meet this standard are deemed
inherently unworthy of Convention refugee status and thus subject to
exclusion without full consideration of the merits of their refugee claim.
The rationale for Article I(F) is not the protection of asylum-state safety
and security interests (although it may sometimes be an ancillary result of
peremptory exclusion).
Concerns about threats to the safety and security of an asylum state
should be factored into the protection decision, instead, through an excep-
tion to the duty of states not to expose a refugee to the risk of return to
persecution, the duty of non-refoulement.7 Article 33(2) of the Convention
authorizes a government to refuse to protect a refugee whose presence
6. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of ref-
uge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. I(F), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
7. "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." Id. art. 33(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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threatens its most basic interests.8 A receiving state may even return a dan-
gerous refugee to face the risk of persecution in his or her state of origin,
but only if the risk to national security or communal safety is established
on the basis of a more demanding standard of proof.
Asylum states often resist this division of labor between Article I(F)
and Article 33(2). The attraction of Article 1(F) is that, in contrast to Arti-
cle 33(2), it authorizes a state to forego its usual responsibility to assess
refugee status. For states committed to barring the entry of potentially
violent noncitizens to the greatest extent legally possible, it presents an
administratively "least bad option." Reliance on Article I(F) does not sanc-
tion automatic denials of entry, but it does allow the adjudication of safety
concerns as a preliminary matter and according to a lower standard of
proof.
Yet in relying on the peremptory Article I(F) procedure to deny refu-
gee status for safety and security reasons that are relevant only to an appli-
cation to authorize refoulement under Article 33(2), governments
contravene international refugee law. The Refugee Convention authorizes
summary denial of refugee status only to persons adjudged inherently
unworthy of protection as measured by reference to external standards of
international or extraditable criminality. Governments are entitled to
invoke an expansive range of concerns to justify a denial of protection on
the grounds of safety or security, but only if they are prepared to meet the
more demanding procedural requirements of Article 33(2). States that act
under Article I(F) to vindicate safety and security interests effectively
demand the best of both worlds, denying the critical balance at the heart of
the Refugee Convention between refugee rights and asylum-state interests.
State practice that confuses the roles of Articles I(F) and 33(2) can
ironically be justified by the official positions of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR defines Article I(F) and
Article 33(2) as complementary mechanisms, both directed to the protec-
tion of asylum-state interests. 9 Much contemporary state practice has
taken its cue from UNHCR's recommendations, which appear to justify
reliance on the peremptory procedures of Article 1(F) to vindicate safety
and security concerns described in Article 33(2).
The UNHCR view has recently, however, come under fundamental
challenge from the most senior courts of the United Kingdom, the United
8. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refu-
gee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security
of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.
Id. art. 33(2). For the minority of refugees that may lawfully be removed to a state other
than their country of origin, only the requirements of Article 32 of the Refugee Conven-
tion need be met. Specifically, expulsion is authorized "on grounds of national security
or public order" and must be "in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with
due process of law"-some aspects of which are specifically set out. Id. art. 32, 189
U.N.T.S. at 174.
9. Infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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States, and Canada, all of which have explicitly or impliedly interpreted
Article I(F) as directed to the historically grounded purpose of excluding
fundamentally unworthy persons from refugee status, not to the promotion
of asylum-state welfare. This Article builds upon this embryonic jurispru-
dence challenging the traditional approach modeled on UNHCR's effective
merger of Articles 1(F) and 33(2) and demonstrates how the combination
of these two mechanisms deals fairly with both refugees and the states to
which they turn for protection.
We begin by setting out detailed reasons in support of our view that
Articles 1(F) and 33(2) serve complementary, but distinct purposes. Our
analysis is firmly grounded in a reading of the Refugee Convention that
interprets the text in the light of the historical record of the treaty's objects
and purposes.10 As the House of Lords observed, it makes good sense to
give serious weight to the relevant travaux preparatoires of the Refugee
Convention:
Inevitably the final text will have been the product of a long period of negoti-
ation and compromise.... It follows that one is more likely to arrive at the
true construction of [the Refugee Convention] by seeking a meaning which
makes sense in the light of the Convention as a whole, and the purposes
which the framers of the Convention were seeking to achieve, rather than by
concentrating exclusively on the language. A broad approach is what is
needed, rather than a narrow linguistic approach. 11
Indeed, such a holistic approach to treaty interpretation of the Refugee
Convention is required by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties:12
In interpreting a treaty, it is erroneous to adopt a rigid priority in the appli-
cation of interpretive rules.... Although the text of a treaty may itself reveal
its object and purpose or at least assist in ascertaining its object and pur-
pose, assistance may also be obtained from extrinsic sources. The form in
which a treaty is drafted, the subject to which it relates, the mischief that it
addresses, the history of its negotiations and comparison with earlier or
amending instruments relating to the same subject may warrant considera-
tion in arriving at the true interpretation of its text.13
While insisting on precision in the interpretation of international refu-
gee law, our point is emphatically not that states should open their doors
to persons whose engagement in or advocacy of violence threatens the
10. While we adopt a contextual approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention,
other scholars express reservations about the value of the Refugee Convention's drafting
history, preferring a more literal approach to treaty interpretation. E.g., Guy S. GooD-
wIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNA IONAL LAv 368 (2d ed. 1996) ("For better or worse,
refugee status decision-makers (and commentators.. .) make frequent use of the travaux
prdparatoires to the 1951 Convention. Many key terms are vague, undefined and open to
interpretation, but the results of inquiry into the background... can be rather mixed.").
11. Adan v. Home Sec'y, [1999] 1 A.C. 293, 305 (1998) (Lloyd of Berwick, L.J.)
(appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
12. Done May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
13. "Applicant A" v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 C.L.R.
225, 231 (Austl.) (Brennan, CJ.).
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safety of the host-state community. 14 But neither should governments dis-
regard the balanced approach to those concerns, which they have enacted
into international law. The Refugee Convention is a supple instrument,
capable of meeting the challenges of the new world disorder.15 For both
principled and pragmatic reasons, this Article emphasizes the importance
of not confusing international criminals' and legal fugitives' exclusion from
refugee status with measured efforts to defend the safety and security of
communities that receive refugees. Both are important goals, but they are
not the same goal.
I. Is Peremptory Exclusion Lawful?
A preliminary question is whether governments should ever be entitled to
exclude an asylum seeker summarily from protection. After all, each gov-
ernment already enjoys the right to interpret the refugee definition without
significant international scrutiny.16 If governments are allowed to deny
refugee status without fully considering the merits of the case, the potential
for abuse of authority increases. Yet the Refugee Convention's drafters rec-
ognized the importance of reassuring states that accession to international
refugee law would not require them to admit either international criminals
or fugitives from justice. The Convention therefore authorizes state parties
to order peremptory exclusion based on a low evidentiary threshold, 17 but
14. Indeed, international human rights law now imposes a duty on states to take
affirmative measures in pursuit of their populations' physical security. For example, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee found Article 9(1) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9(1), S. TREATY Doc. No.
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant], infringed
where the Colombian government failed to respond meaningfully to death threats
against a teacher who was ultimately forced to flee the country. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II, Annex IX(D), T 3.6, 5.5-.6, at 46-48, U.N. Doc.
A/45/40 (1990) (discussing W. Delgado Paez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/
1985). In general, the duty to take affirmative steps to protect human rights is clear.
See, e.g., Civil and Political Covenant, supra, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2(1), S. TRrATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85Sp,
114 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54 Sess., 4053d mtg. CI 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1269, at 2 (1999) (calling upon states to "take appropriate measures in conformity with
the relevant provisions of national and international law, including standards of human
rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker
has not participated in terrorist acts" (emphasis added)).
16. In contrast to most major human rights treaties elaborated by the United
Nations, state parties to the Refugee Convention agreed to no periodic reporting obliga-
tion, much less an interstate or individuated complaint procedure. See James C.
Hathaway, The International Refugee Rights Regime, in 8-2 COLLECTED COURSES OF TH
ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAw 91 (1997).
17. In the view of UNHCR, the standard of proof required for exclusion is best stated
as "substantially demonstrable grounds." Note on the Exclusion Clauses, U.N. Executive
Comm. of the High Comm'r's Programme, 47th Sess., 8th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. EC/47/
SC/CRP.29 (1997), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/excom/
standcom/1997/29.htm [hereinafter UNHCR Exclusion Note]. This standard implies
more than mere suspicion or conjecture, yet less than proof on a balance of probabilities.
Exclusion can follow even if the asylum seeker has never been formally charged with or
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only if the state reasonably believes a particular asylum seeker committed
an indisputably wrong act-an international crime, an act contrary to the
principles and purposes of the United Nations, or a serious nonpolitical
crime committed outside the asylum state.
The general impetus for the elaboration of Article 1(F) of the Conven-
tion was a determination to give legal force to Article 14(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that the right to asylum "may
not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations."1 8 Article 1(F) primarily reflects a principled commit-
ment to the promotion of an international morality through refugee law.19
As observed by the French representative,
it must be made quite clear that the object was not to specify in the Conven-
tion what treatment each country must mete out to individuals who had
placed themselves beyond the pale, but only to state whether a country was
entitled, in granting refugee status to such individuals, to do so on the
responsibility of the High Commissioner and of the United Nations.
20
This fundamental conviction that certain persons are beyond the
pale-simply "not . ..deserving of international protection"2 1-led the
drafters to craft Article 1(F) as a mandatory mechanism of exclusion.
Thus, although a government may invoke its sovereignty to admit a person
described in Article I(F) to its territory, it is absolutely barred from grant-
ing Convention refugee status to that person.2 2 The drafters considered,
but ultimately rejected a proposal advanced by the United States that
would have allowed "the question [to] remain within the discretion of each
receiving country" by stipulating only that "[t]he High Contracting Parties
convicted of a criminal offense. Indeed, no positive or concluded findings are required,
so long as there are reasoned findings supporting the criminal allegation. See generally
Joint Position Defined by the Council on the Harmonized Application of the Definition
of the Term 'Refugee,' § 13, 1996 OJ. (L 63) 2, 7 [hereinafter EUJoint Position] (discuss-
ing the standards for the various clauses of Article I(F)). Moreover, "the burden of
establishing serious reasons for considering that [relevant crimes have] been committed
[falls] on the party asserting the existence of such reasons .. " Ramirez v. Minister of
Employment & Immigration, [1992] 2 F.C. 306, 314 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
18. G.A. Res. 217A, art. 14(2), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948). An early formulation
of Article I(F) provided simply that "[n]o person to whom Article 14, paragraph 2 of the
aforesaid Declaration is applicable shall be recognized as a refugee." Correction to the
Proposal for a Draft Convention Supported by France, U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Stateless-
ness & Related Problems, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.3/Corr.1, at 1 (1950).
19. Arguably, this clause's initial purpose was simply the states' practical concern to
avoid conflicts between their duty to protect refugees and their obligations under extra-
dition treaties. States reached an agreement on Article 1(F)(b) for a combination of
symbolic and practical reasons. See infra Part IV.A.
20. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Soc. Comm., 166th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.166,
at 4 (1950) (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France).
21. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 1 140, at 33.
22. NEHEMii ROBINSON, CONVENISTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS:
ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 25 (1955) ("[Section F] is couched in categorical lan-
guage .... It follows that, once a determination is made that there are sufficient reasons
to consider a certain person as coming under this [section], the country making the
determination is barred from according him the status of a [refugee].").
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shall be under no obligation to apply the terms of this convention to any
person."23 France objected to the "disturbing... moral consequences" 24
of the U.S. approach. Israel similarly opposed the U.S. draft "on moral
grounds," insisting that any state that decided to admit such a person
would be "granting special benefits to a category of undesirable persons
and thus placing itself in an unfavourable position vis a vis those States
which adhered strictly to their obligations under the convention."25 The
United States ultimately acquiesced. 26
Because no asylum seeker described in Article I(F) can qualify for
Convention refugee status, state parties to the Refugee Convention are
under no duty to consider the merits of a protection claim made by such a
person. Although it may sometimes be more convenient to consider an
Article I(F) exclusion in the course of an asylum hearing, at least where the
facts that justify peremptory exclusion are intertwined with those relating
to refugee status, there is no legal impediment to addressing Article I(F)
concerns as a preliminary matter.27
II. International Crimes: Article 1(F)(a)
Assuming that it is lawful for states to rely on Article 1(F) as a mechanism
for peremptory exclusion, to what extent are its three substantive branches
relevant for states anxious to exclude asylum seekers who have promoted
or committed acts of violence? The first part of Article 1(F) excludes from
23. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 17th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.17, at 8 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States).
24. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 18th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.18, at 3 (1950) (statement of Mr. Rain of France).
25. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 17th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.17, at 9 (1950) (statement of Mr. Robinson of Israel).
26. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 18th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR. 18, at 3 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States). As a result,
the general clause of Article I(F) was phrased in mandatory terms. The detailed discus-
sions of the various sub-articles of Article 1(F) did not revisit this consensus.
27. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
Though the BIA in the instant case declined to make findings respecting the risk
of persecution facing respondent, this was because it determined respondent
was barred from withholding under the serious nonpolitical crime exception.
The BIA, in effect, found respondent ineligible for withholding even on the
assumption he could establish a threat of persecution. This approach is consis-
tent with the language and purposes of the statute.
Id. at 426 (citations omitted). UNHCR, in contrast, believes that exclusion should usu-
ally be considered as part of the status in determination.
Normally it will be during the process of determining a person's refugee status
that the facts leading to exclusion ... will emerge. It may, however, also happen
that the facts justifying exclusion will become known only after a person has
been recognized as a refugee. In such cases, the exclusion clause will call for a
cancellation of the decision previously taken.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 3, l 140, at 33. Deborah Anker argues for a more
emphatic position. DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 417 (3d ed.
1999) ("The Convention envisions application of the exclusion clauses during the deter-
mination of refugee (or asylum) status and generally requires consideration of individu-
alized circumstances...').
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refugee status persons who are believed to have "committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the interna-
tional instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes."28 As this language implies, Article 1(F)(a) does not directly
address exclusion on the grounds of risk to an asylum country. Nonethe-
less, some refugees who meet the categorical ineligibility criterion of Arti-
cle l(F)(a) are also persons a state may wish to exclude for its own security
reasons.
For example, Spain appropriately denied refugee status to a Colom-
bian asylum seeker because he had committed particularly cruel acts as a
member of the insurgent Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia.29
Although Spain avoided its prima facie duty of protection, exclusion under
Article l(F)(a) was not lawful because of any security risk to Spain, but
because Spain successfully linked the acts committed to conduct defined
as fundamentally unacceptable under the Geneva Conventions regulating
the protection of civilians during armed conflict.30
Article 1(F)(a) has less effect, however, as a means of peremptorily
excluding persons who have engaged in acts of violence outside the context
of war.31 Some violent asylum seekers will be barred by virtue of the evolv-
ing notion of crimes against humanity, which now includes murder, severe
deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts of
similar character.32 But the listed actions are only crimes against human-
28. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(F)(a), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
29. Spanish Ministry of Interior, Decision No. 962802090007 (June 17, 1993).
30. Id. The Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes within
the court's jurisdiction to include grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, other
specified serious violations of the law and customs of war, and violations of common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., art. 8(2)(a-(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, at 6-9 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
31. For example, the United Nations deferred inclusion of "terrorism" and drug-
related crimes as matters within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
both because agreement on a definition proved illusive and because many governments
felt that the complexity of these crimes meant that they were better dealt with at the
national level. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/10, Annex I, Res. E ("[A] Review Conference pursuant to article 123 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court [should be held to] consider the crimes of
terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their
inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
32. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced ster-
ilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
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ity if "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,"33 defined to
mean "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts...
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack."34 Because many asylum
seekers will have been involved with acts of violence that do not meet this
high standard, Article 1(F)(a) answers only a fairly small subset of asylum-
state concerns.
III. Acts Contrary to the Principles and Purposes of the United
Nations: Article l(F)(c)
Some asylum seekers who have engaged in or advocated the use of violence
will also find themselves peremptorily barred from refugee status on the
basis of the Refugee Convention's Article 1(F)(c), which denies refugee sta-
tus to persons believed "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and princi-
ples of the United Nations.135 Because only governments are parties to the
U.N. Charter, the traditional view is that Article 1(F)(c) applies to persons
formally entrusted with domestic implementation of U.N. principles and
purposes, not ordinary citizens. 36 This clause has therefore been invoked
to exclude from refugee status persons who used a position of power to
violate human rights. In 1996, however, the United Kingdom sponsored an
initiative in the General Assembly of the United Nations that would have
required states to refuse refugee protection, on the basis of Article 1(F)(c),
to anyone who is a terrorist or "who financed, planned and incited terrorist
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... , or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connec-
tion with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the juris-
diction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suf-
fering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
ICC Statute, supra note 30, art 7(1).
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
35. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. l(F)(c), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
36. "It was difficult to see how an individual could commit acts contrary to the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, membership of which was
confined to sovereign States." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Soc. Comm., 160th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/AC.7/SR.160, at 15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Bernstein of Chile); see also ATLE
GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 (1966); JAMES C.
HATHAwAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 226-29 (1991). Contra U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council Soc. Comm., 166th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.166, at 5 (1950) (statement of
Mr. Rochefort of France) ("So far as acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the
United Nations were concerned, the first question which arose was whether such acts
could be committed by individuals. An affirmative reply to that question was given by
articles 14 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."). Some commenta-
tors take more flexible position in line with this view. ANKER, supra note 27, at 421-22;
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 10, at 110-14.
Vol. 34
2001 Framing Refugee Protection
deeds."37 This mandatory reinterpretation of Article l(F)(c) was defeated,
in large measure because states were appropriately skeptical that the Gen-
eral Assembly had the authority to amend the Refugee Convention
indirectly.38
But even as it rejected the British proposal for a mandatory reinterpre-
tation of Article 1(F)(c), the General Assembly's 1997 Resolution on Mea-
sures to Eliminate International Terrorism invited states to "take
appropriate measures.., before granting asylum, for the purpose of ensur-
ing that the asylum seeker has not participated in terrorist acts." 39 The
resolution identified terrorism as a violation of the purposes and principles
of the United Nations, impliedly encouraging states to exclude terrorists
under Article 1(F)(c).40 However, even this more modest initiative is
legally problematic. Putting to one side the question of whether the Gen-
eral Assembly has the authority by a nonbinding resolution to vary the
principles and purposes of the United Nations,41 the General Assembly
should not characterize a matter as contrary to the principles and purposes
37. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 10th mtg. 1119, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.10,
at 5 (1996) (statement of Ms. Wilmhurst of the United Kingdom).
38. Switzerland questioned whether certain paragraphs of the proposed [Decla-
ration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism] did not run the risk of
reinterpreting certain provisions of the [1951 Refugee] Convention which, his-
torically, had been quite clear. Any reinterpretation which modified the provi-
sions of the Convention would be tantamount to an amendment thereto,
something that could only be undertaken by the bodies specified in the Conven-
tion itself. He welcomed the statement by the representative of the United King-
dom that that was not the aim of the proposed declaration. Switzerland was of
the view, however, that the aims of the declaration could best be achieved on the
basis of the established interpretation of the 1951 Convention. The interna-
tional community must not allow the urgency of the task of combating terrorism
to lead it to violate other key principles of international relations.
U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 4th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.11, at 11 (1996)
(statement of Mr. Pfirter, Observer for Switzerland). Mr. Pfirter made these comments
during debate leading to passage of Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (U.N.
1997 Terrorism Declaration). G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 151,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Terrorism Declaration].
39. 1997 Terrorism Declaration, supra note 38, Annex, 113.
40. "The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that acts, methods and
practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;
they declare that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Id. Annex, 2. The Gen-
eral Assembly did not intend to encourage states to deviate in any sense from their
duties under international refugee law. Id. Annex, pmbl.
41. The General Assembly has no general lawmaling authority. U.N. CHARTER art.
10. While agreeing that General Assembly resolutions are not binding international
law, Ian Brownlie nonetheless suggests that "[iln some cases a resolution may have
direct legal effect as an authoritative interpretation and application of the principles of
the Charter." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWV 14-15 (5d ed.
1998). Others have argued that General Assembly resolutions play a role in the creation
of customary international law. Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited
(Forty Years Later), 58 BrT. Y.B. IN'r'. L. 39, 93 (1987). A stronger case for authority to
vary the principles and purposes of the United Nations might be made for condemna-
tions of terrorism by the Security Council. E.g., S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4053d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999). But not even thd Security Council has gen-
eral authority to make binding decisions on all subjects. See UN CHARTErR ch. 7.
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of the United Nations absent a clear normative consensus.42 Yet the 1997
Resolution does not provide a general definition of "terrorism." Treaties on
"terrorism" adopted at the universal level, such as earlier European initia-
tives, 43 have generally avoided the generic criminalization of "terrorism" in
favor of specific commitments to more effectively enforce existing norms.
44
Only the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention), opened for signature in Janu-
ary 2000, attempts a more general definition of terrorism.45 The General
42. [T~he international community has been striving to avoid giving the benefit
of political asylum to those who can truly be categorised as terrorists .... I say
"striving to," because no Convention has yet been adopted which deals with this
situation on a universal basis (or even in respect of states which are members of
the United Nations) and a complete definition of "terrorist act" which takes
such act outside the range of political crime may be very difficult to achieve and
even more to obtain agreement to on the part of states.
T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. 742, 774 (1995) (Slynn of Hadley, LJ.) (appeal taken from
Eng. C.A.) (citations omitted).
43. For example, the pioneering European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism codifies a fairly uncontroversial list of prohibited acts: aircraft hijacking; attacks on
internationally protected persons; kidnapping; hostage-taking; serious unlawful deten-
tion; and offenses involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, or
letter or parcel bomb to endanger persons. To ensure that any person who commits a
relevant crime is brought to justice, contracting states agree to exclude all prohibited acts
from the political offense exception, pursuant to which governments have insisted on
the right to withhold extradition. Faced with a request for extradition based on a prohib-
ited act, a state party must either extradite or prosecute the offender. European Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism, done Jan. 27, 1977, arts. 1, 7, Europ. T.S. No. 90
[hereinafter European Terrorism Convention].
44. These treaties address terrorism through specific concerns, such as interference
with air and sea transportation, attacks on diplomats, and hostage-taking. E.g., Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted Dec. 15, 1997, S.
TREATY Doc. 106-6 (1999), 37 I.L.M. 251 (1998) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Conven-
tion]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. 101-1 (1989), 27 I.L.M. 672; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Con-
tinental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. 101-1 (1989), 27 I.L.M. 685; Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREArY Doc. 100-19, 27 I.L.M. 627; International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
45. In addition to prohibiting financial support for various specific acts already
agreed to constitute forms of terrorism, see supra note 44, this Convention criminalizes
the funding of
[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, where the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organi-
zation to do or to abstain from doing any act.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted
Dec. 9, art. 2(1)(b), 39 I.L.M. 270, 271 [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention]. If
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Assembly's decision to promote the peremptory exclusion of asylum seek-
ers without a clear and comprehensive international legal definition was
therefore of questionable propriety.
If no international consensus on the substance of a U.N. principle
exists, yet states are nonetheless invited to rely on that principle as grounds
for summary exclusion of asylum seekers, it is inevitable that national and
personal subjectivities will influence its interpretation. For example, one
judge of the House of Lords supported exclusion by relying on a definition
of terrorism from a 1937 League of Nations Convention, even though he
candidly conceded that "[tihe Convention never came into force, but the
definition is serviceable .... *46 The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal
recently held that it "accept[ed] that nations may be unable to reach a con-
sensus as to an exact definition of terrorism. But this cannot be taken to
mean that there is no common ground with respect to certain types of
conduct."4 7
Of even greater concern, the United States codified a bar on asylum or
withholding of deportation for persons who have engaged in terrorism or
who the U.S. government reasonably believes have incited or are engaged
in, or likely to engage in, terrorist activity.4 8 The United States implements
this policy using a domestic definition of terrorism.49 Yet measured
against even the most ambitious United Nations effort to promote such a
definition, 50 U.S. law clearly disfranchises a broader category of refugees
than an interpretation of Article l(F)(c) rooted in international law would
allow. For example, while the U.N. Terrorist Financing Convention
requires a threat of death or serious bodily injury, the U.S. provision also
includes detention as a terrorist act. The Terrorist Financing Convention
requires that the threat be directed against a civilian or noncombatant,
this conceptual standard attracts substantial support, it may provide the basis for the
long-awaited generic criminalization of terrorism, a project to which the General Assem-
bly has now committed itself in principle. Id. pmbl.
46. T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. at 773 (Mustill, L.J.). This conclusion is particu-
larly regrettable, as the earlier analysis in this opinion is more perceptive than any deci-
sion rendered by a senior court on the meaning of Article 1(F). Although these remarks
were made in an analysis of Article 1(F)(b), they nonetheless demonstrate the absence of
a sanctioned international standard of terrorist activity.
47. Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 629, 673
(Can. Fed. Ct. 2000). Ironically, the consensus identified by the court erroneously sug-
gested that killing innocent civilians necessarily amounts to a crime against humanity.
Compare id., with supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
"crime against humanity").
48. Under U.S. law, courts must refuse to withhold deportation on national security
grounds if the government believes the applicant has engaged in "terrorist activity." 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2000). An individual "engages" in terrorist activity if he or she,
inter alia, provides any material support or funding to an individual who has already
committed, or plans to commit, a terrorist act. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2000).
49. The Secretary of State has designated twenty-eight groups as terrorist organiza-
tions under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed.
Reg. 55,112-13 (Oct. 8, 1999). The courts have thus far upheld the authority of the
government to make these designations based on a secret and untested record. People's
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
50. See supra note 45.
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while U.S. law is not similarly constrained. Perhaps most important, the
international standard deems a relevant act terrorism only if the individual
intended to coerce action by a government or international organization,
while U.S. law considers an intent to compel action by any third party
sufficient.5 1
Our point is not that the various understandings of terrorism
embraced by national courts and governments are wrong or that the Ter-
rorist Financing Convention's approach is clearly preferable. But exclusion
based on a domestic definition of terrorism is at odds with the purpose of
Article l(F)(c) to exclude from refugee status only persons who have con-
travened "the principles and purposes of the United Nations."'5 2 Because
the General Assembly's declaration that terrorism is contrary to the princi-
ples and purposes of the United Nations preceded, and still precedes, the
adoption of a clear and workable international legal definition of terrorist
activity, it has engendered ambiguity in the application of what should be a
common international standard.5 3
The Canadian Supreme Court recently defined a more nuanced means
to expand the scope of Article l(F)(c). In Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration, the court determined that "where a widely
accepted international agreement or United Nations resolution explicitly
declares that the commission of certain acts is contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations, then there is a strong indication that
those acts will fall within Article 1F(c)."5 4 The court cited General Assem-
bly resolutions condemning terrorism as examples of standards that "des-
ignate acts which are contrary to the principles and purposes of the United
Nations. Where such declarations or resolutions represent a reasonable
consensus of the international community, then that designation should be
considered determinative.15 5 While largely sympathetic to the court's basic
51. Compare Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 45, art. 2(1)(b), 37 I.L.M. at
271, with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(Il).
52. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(F)(c), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156 (emphasis
added).
53. More generally, the definition of a refugee entitled to Convention rights, includ-
ing the provisions for criminal and other exclusion, is not subject to reservation. Refu-
gee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1, 42(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152-56, 182. But the United
States Supreme Court held that Convention refugees are not rights-holders, but simply
persons entitled to ask the Attorney-General to grant asylum in her discretion. SeeJames
C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. I.J.
481, 484-98, 534-38 (2000) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)). In the Supreme Court's view, only a subset of persons
who meet the international refugee definition, namely those able to prove a probability
of persecution, may claim Convention rights. Id. Even these "super-refugees" may only
insist on the benefit of Article 33-the duty of non-refoulement-not the full range of
rights set out in Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. Id. This interpretation is
completely aberrational, supported neither by the textual scope of relevant international
law nor by the practice of any other state party. Id.
54. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1030 (Can.).
55. Id. (emphasis added). The force of the Canadian Supreme Court's position is
strengthened by its clarification that only a subset of those standards is relevant to the
Article 1(F)(c) inquiry, namely those that assist in defining "individuals responsible for
serious, sustained or systemic violations of fundamental human rights which amount to
2001 Framing Refugee Protection
approach, we believe it raises two fundamental concerns.5 6
First, the court's reference to terrorism as an act that justifies exclu-
sion under Article l(F)(c) implies that this clause should not, as was histor-
ically the case, apply only to persons who abused positions of
governmental authority. As Mr. Justice Bastarache stated:
Although it may be more difficult for a non-state actor to perpetrate human
rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution without the state
thereby implicitly adopting those acts, the possibility should not be
excluded a priori .... [T]he Court must ... take into consideration that
some crimes that have specifically been declared to contravene the purposes
and principles of the United Nations are not restricted to state actors.57
Yet, as the judgment itself acknowledges, other states, UNHCR, and
many commentators take the position that Article l(F)(c) only addresses
the exclusion of persons who held a position of governance. 58 Indeed,
nonstate actors capable of displacing legitimate state authorities have only
recently been held accountable for violations of international core
norms.59 Perhaps because of the continuing uncertainty on these issues,
the Government of the Netherlands declared Articlel(F)(c) an inherently
vague basis for any peremptory exclusion and therefore decided not to rely
on this provision at all.60
Even if the Canadian Supreme Court appropriately stated the modern
position on liability of nonstate actors to abide by fundamental principles
persecution in a non-war setting." Id. at 1029. Measured against this standard, Article
l(F)(c) clearly assists in excluding refugees who were responsible for an ongoing viola-
tion of basic human rights.
56. As a practical matter, Pushpanathan's interpretive structure requires fairly
sophisticated legal analysis, making it a less-than-ideal tool for many frontline refugee
decision-makers. See Gerry Van Kessel, Canada's Approach Towards Exclusion Ground
IF, in REFUGEE LAw IN CONrXT: THE ExcLusIoN CLAUSE 287, 292 (Peter J. van Krieken
ed., 1999) [hereinafter REFUGEE LAW IN CoNTEx-T].
57. Pushpanathan, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 1031-32.
58. Nicole Michel, Purposes and Principles of the United Nations: The Way in Which
France Applies Article 1F(c)," in REFUGEE LAw IN CONTEXT, supra note 56, at 294-96.
59. The recent decision of the United Nations Committee Against Torture held that
for a number of years Somalia has been without a central government, that the
international community negotiates with the warring factions and that some of
the factions operating in Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institutions
and are negotiating the establishment of a common administration. It follows
then that, de facto, those factions exercise certain prerogatives that are compara-
ble to those normally exercised by legitimate governments. Accordingly, the
members of those factions can fall ... within the phrase "public officials or
other persons acting in an official capacity ...."
U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex VII(A)(11) a1 6.5,
at 119, U.N. Doc. A/54/44 (1999) (discussing Elmi v. Australia, Communication No.
120/1998).
60. "I shall not use the term 'acts in contravention of the [principles] and purposes
of the United Nations contained in [Article 1] F(c) as independent grounds. The exclu-
sion provisions of [Articles] 1(F)(a) and 1(F)(b) provide enough starting points at pre-
sent for exclusion in cases where it is indicated." Letter from the Netherlands Secretary
of State for Justice to Parliament, Nov. 28, 1997, Kamerstukken 1997-1998, nr. 19637,
nr. 195 (unofficial translation, on file with the authors) [hereinafter Netherlands Policy
Statement].
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of the United Nations, a second concern arises from its willingness to view
even legally nonbinding General Assembly declarations as capable of rede-
fining the scope of Article l(F)(c) on a "determinative" basis. 61 Acknowl-
edging the importance of looking beyond the U.N. Charter to understand
the contemporary scope of the principles and purposes of the United
Nations, 62 objection might still be taken to the notion that legally nonbind-
ing General Assembly declarations can effect such a redefinition. 63
At the very least, however, we believe there would be general agree-
ment that it makes sense to look to widely ratified United Nations treaties
in defining the evolving nature of U.N. principles and purposes.64 Thus,
for example, an asylum seeker believed to have engaged in hijacking or an
attack on an internationally protected person might appropriately be
excluded under Article l(F)(c). 6 5 Article l(F)(c) therefore has the potential
to exclude some asylum seekers who have committed or facilitated acts of
violence, in addition to the class of persons already captured by Article
1(F)(a). If consensus can be achieved on the thorny issue of the duty of
persons not in positions of official authority to govern their conduct by the
principles and purposes of the United Nations, widely subscribed United
Nations treaties on human rights and criminal law could define a broader
class of individuals considered inherently unworthy of Convention refugee
status.
IV. Serious Nonpolitical Crimes: Article 1(F)(b)
As the analysis in Sections II and III makes clear, neither Article 1(F)(a) nor
Article 1(F)(c) of the Refugee Convention presently affords a neat means of
peremptorily excluding all asylum seekers believed to have committed or
facilitated acts of violence. Most official attention has therefore focused on
the remaining peremptory exclusion clause, Article 1(F)(b). The "common
61. Supra text accompanying note 55.
62. The Austrian Administrative Court took a different view. Georg K v. Ministry of
the Interior, VwSIgNF-A 185/72, 71 I.L.R. 284 (Aus. VwGH 1972). Although the court
in this case agreed that individuals who have not held positions of governmental author-
ity may nonetheless violate the principles and purposes of the United Nations, the court
considered the U.N. Charter the relevant point of reference.
The decisive factor in determining whether the conduct of a natural person falls
within Article l(F)(c) can only be whether or not it is aimed at and objectively
capable of impairing or disturbing the peaceful order among the subjects of
international law which is set out in the Charter of the United Nations.
Id., 71 I.L.R. at 290.
63. Supra note 41. The Canadian Supreme Court is not alone in endorsing the legal
significance of General Assembly resolutions for purposes of interpreting Article l(F)(c).
See, e.g., EUJoint Position, supra note 17, § 13.3, para. 3 ("In order to determine whether
an action may be deemed contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
Member States should take account of the conventions and resolutions adopted in this
connection under the auspices of the United Nations.").
64. Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982,
1030 (Can.).
65. See supra note 44 (listing treaties prohibiting hijacking and attacks on interna-
tionally protected persons).
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law criminality clause"6 6 authorizes a state party to the Refugee Conven-
tion to exclude from refugee status all persons it reasonably believes have
committed "a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country .... -67 Perhaps even more fre-
quently than in the case of Articles l(F)(a) and l(F)(c), some asylum seek-
ers appropriately excluded under Article l(F)(b) will be persons who have
engaged in or promoted acts of violence. But it is important to remember
that Article l(F)(b) is an integral part of Article 1(F), the general purpose
of which is not the protection of asylum-state safety and security, but the
exclusion of persons deemed inherently unworthy of Convention refugee
status. 68 Article l(F)(b) therefore does not license receiving countries to
exclude peremptorily asylum seekers in the exercise of security-based dis-
cretion. Any contribution to the security of the asylum state that follows
from application of Article l(F)(b) must, in other words, be purely inciden-
tal to its valid invocation.
Rather than promoting asylum-state safety, Article l(F)(b) implements
the core of Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by
which the right to asylum "may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes .... '"69 Simply put, the draft-
ers believed that fugitives from justice-including both those whose seri-
ous, unpunished criminal conduct would bring refugee law into disrepute
and the narrower category of persons who would use refugee status to
avoid lawful extradition-were inherently unworthy of refugee status. As
elaborated below, the definition of criminality for purposes of Article
l(F)(b), like the exclusion tests under Article l(F)(a) and Article l(F)(c), is
premised on the satisfaction of an external standard.70 Specifically, only
asylum seekers who meet the asylum state's definition of extraditable crim-
inality are appropriately excluded from refugee status under Article
l(F)(b).
Both the British House of Lords and United States Supreme Court
have issued ground-breaking judgments that affirm the need to base Article
l(F)(b) analysis in norms of extradition law. The 1996 British decision in
T. v. Home Secretary provided the most detailed analysis. The House of
Lords upheld the denial of refugee status to an Algerian member of the
Front islamique du salut (FIS) involved in planting a bomb at the Algiers
airport and attacking an army barracks to protest the annulment of an
66. It is evident from the literature ... that the rather puzzling expression "un
crime de droit commun," often rendered as "common crime," has nothing to do
with the common law, but is equivalent to "ordinary crime," or conduct
recognised as criminal by the common consent of nations. Murder is a common
crime; treason is not.
T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. 742, 759 (1995) (Mustill, L.J.) (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.).
67. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. l(F)(b), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
68. Supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 14(2), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 74 (1948).
70. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
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election in which the FIS had secured a majority of votes.7 1 The founda-
tional premise in T. v. Home Secretary was that the interpretation of Article
l(F)(b) should be firmly anchored in the same norms relevant to an adjudi-
cation for extradition. Speaking for three of the five law lords who ren-
dered the decision, Lord Lloyd of Berwick observed that
it was common ground that the words ["non-political crime"] must bear the
same meaning as they do in extradition law. Indeed, it appears from the
travaux pr~paratoires that the framers of the convention had extradition law
in mind when drafting the convention, and intended to make use of the
same concept, although the application of the concept would, of course, be
for a different purpose.7 2
In one of the two concurring judgments, Lord Mustill acknowledged that
the reference to the "serious non-political crime" in the [Refugee Conven-
tion] must surely be an echo of the political exception which had been a
feature of extradition treaties for nearly a century, and one may hope that
decisions on the political exception would provide a comprehensive frame-
work for the few and scattered decisions on asylum. 73
In its 1999 decision of INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the refusal of asylum to a Guatemalan who participated in student
protests against the government's failure to investigate murders and disap-
pearances. 74 Aguirre-Aguirre had forced passengers on public buses to
disembark, pelting them with sticks and stones when necessary, then set
the buses on fire.75 In support of its decision to apply Article 1(F)(b), the
U.S. Supreme Court endorsed Lord Mustill's approach to the definition of a
nonpolitical crime.7 6 While the Aguirre-Aguirre decision was not explicitly
framed by reference to standards of extradition law, the holding insisted on
an approach to Article 1(F)(b) that mirrors the analysis for an extradition
request.
First, Aguirre-Aguirre rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's
view that "additional factors" beyond the usual extradition-based concern-
including consideration of whether the offense involved either "atrocity" or
"gross disproportionality" of means to an end and an evaluation of the
"necessity" and "success" of the applicant's actions-are required to
exclude under Article 1(F)(b). To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that, as in extradition law, these concerns are simply factors to con-
sider in determining whether "the political aspect of an offense outweighs
its common-law character."7 7 Second, the Supreme Court rejected the so-
called "balancing test" advocated by UNHCR and lower courts. 78 In line
71. T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. at 753.
72. Id. at 778 (Lloyd of Berwick, LJ.).
73. Id. at 764 (Mustill, LJ.).
74. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 421 (1999).
75. Id. at 421-22.
76. "'The crime either is or is not political when committed, and its character cannot
depend on the consequences which the offender may afterwards suffer if he is
returned."' Id. at 428 (quoting T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. at 769 (Mustill, LJ.)).
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id. at 428; see also infra Part VI.C.
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with extradition law, Aguirre-Aguirre held that "it is not obvious that an
already-completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering
the further circumstances that the alien may be subject to persecution if
returned to his home country."79
These two judgments, in addition to obiter dicta in two Canadian
Supreme Court decisions,80 adopted an understanding of Article 1(F)(b)
that is at odds with the traditional position advocated by UNHCR and fre-
quently endorsed by lower courts around the world.8 ' None of these deci-
sions by leading common-law courts conceived of Article 1(F)(b) as a
means to deny refugee status based on general concerns for asylum-state
safety or security. Explicitly or implicitly, each court embraced an under-
standing of Article 1(F)(b) rooted in norms of extradition law. As the fol-
lowing analysis illustrates, this approach is consistent with the Refugee
Convention's drafting history and avoids the conceptual and practical pit-
falls of the alternative UNHCR approach.
79. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 426. An earlier federal district court decision explic-
itly recognized the importance of defining the political offense exception in refugee law
as a function of its interpretation in extradition law. Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (involving a refugee claimant who had been a soldier in the army of
Ghana). In 1986, the claimant, disturbed by worsening political conditions and political
executions, participated in a coup against the government. The U.S. Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals excluded him from refugee status on the grounds that he was fundamen-
tally a criminal at risk of prosecution for treason. Rejecting this result, the district court
drew on the predecessor International Refugee Organization (IRO) definition, citing the
desire of the Refugee Convention's drafters to extend "'at least as much protection to
refugees as had been provided by previous agreements.'" Id. at 976 (citing INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 n.20 (1987) (quoting U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on
Statelessness & Related Problems, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/5, at 37 (1950))).
Under the IRO, "the definition of a refugee... [included] individuals who have engaged
in resistance activities against totalitarian government." Id. Indeed, the court noted that
the IRO Manual explicitly endorsed "the long-standing international practice under
extradition law of refusing to return individuals accused of purely political crimes aimed
directly against a government, concluding that the same principle should be applied in
refugee law." Id. (emphasis added).
80. In Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward, the court observed that
Hathaway would appear to confine paragraph (b) to accused persons who are
fugitives from prosecution. The interpretation of this [clause] was not argued
before us. I note, however, that Professor Hathaway's interpretation seems to be
consistent wvith the views expressed in the Travaux preparatoires, regarding the
need for congruence between the Convention and extradition law.
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 743 (Can. 1992) (citations omitted). More recently, the Canadian
Supreme Court's Pushpanathan decision held that "[it is quite clear that Article 1F(b) is
generally meant to prevent ordinary criminals extraditable by treaty from seeking refu-
gee status .... The parties sought to ensure that common criminals should not be able
to avoid extradition and prosecution by claiming refugee status." Pushpanathan v. Min-
ister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1033-34 (Can.). This reasoning
was rejected, however, in Australia. Ovcharuk v. Minister for Immigration & Multicul-
tural Affairs (1998) 158 A.L.R. 289 (Austl. Fed. Ct.) (Branson, J.).
81. For a detailed discussion of the views of UNHCR and the state practice premised
on its interpretation of Article 1(F)(b), see infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
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A. The Historical Record
Our reading of the travaux prdparatoires suggests that while the drafters of
Article I(F)(b) achieved a clear consensus on the scope of this exclusion
clause, their agreement was prompted by distinct, but complementary
objectives.8 2 As previously noted, the inspiration for Article 1(F)(b) was
Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 8 3 That provi-
sion's dry and pragmatic language8 4 suggests a fairly modest and rather
technical reason to enact Article 1(F)(b): avoiding conflict between the
duty to protect refugees and the duty to honor extradition treaties. 8 5 In
line with this goal, some states viewed Article 1(F)(b) as simply making
clear that in conflicts between refugee law and specific extradition treaty
provisions, extradition law would govern.8 6 The British representative, for
example, argued that "the action of States was governed by treaties relating
specifically to extradition, and it would therefore be for States to take
appropriate action in any given case in the light of their obligations under
such treaties."8 7 He opined that there was value in excluding "the person
who was sought ... on legitimate primafacie grounds, for a trial for a non-
political crime."8 8 The Netherlands representative similarly argued for "a
82. Contra GOODWIN-GiLL, supra note 10, at 103-04.
83. Supra text accompanying note 69.
84. Supra text accompanying note 69.
85. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was concerned with
the right of asylum, and its second paragraph constituted a proviso to the gen-
eral provision of the first paragraph. That second paragraph seemed... to be
intended to apply to persons who were fugitives from prosecution in another
country for non-political crimes, and the effect would seem to be that the provi-
sions of article 14 would not override specific extradition obligations.... [Tihe
Convention mentioned neither the right of asylum nor the principle of extradi-
tion. In that connexion, the action of States was governed by treaties relating
specifically to extradition, and it would therefore be for States to take appropri-
ate action in any given case in the light of their obligations under such treaties.
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 29th
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 14-15 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom); see also Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees &
Stateless Persons, 24th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24, at 9 (1951) (statement of Mr.
Herment of Belgium) ("[It was possible that, under international law, a refugee con-
victed of, or charged with, a common-law crime would have necessarily to be handed
over to the authorities of his country of origin. Inclusion of the provision in question was
therefore imperative.").
86. "[T]he exception of common law criminals subject to extradition would natu-
rally continue to be applicable." U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related
Problems, 5th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.5, at 5 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of
the United States); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Soc. Comm., 166th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/AC.7/SR.166, at 4 (1950) (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France). Indeed, the
text adopted by the General Assembly in establishing UNHCR explicitly excluded a per-
son "[i]n respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has commit-
ted a crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition .... Statute of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th
Sess., Supp. No. 20, Annex 1I 7(d), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
87. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 15 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom).
88. Id.; see also id. at 16-17 (statement of Mr. Petren of Sweden).
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reservation on the subject of extradition."89
Yet even those states that supported adoption of Article 1(F)(b) for
fairly practical, extradition-based reasons were not prepared to endorse the
primacy of extradition law in all circumstances. The British representative,
notwithstanding his desire to avoid conflicts between refugee law and
extradition law, objected to the article as initially drafted. He argued that
the version of Article 1(F)(b) presented to the Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries-excluding persons "fall[ing] under the provisions of article 14, para-
graph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"9 0-was too vague
for incorporation in a legally binding treaty. He therefore proposed its
deletion, 91 an action that suggests that he believed it would be better to
compromise extradition obligations than authorize a standard that "would
have made it too easy for States to withdraw the status of refugee from
many persons who had been granted asylum from persecution."92
In the ensuing debate, France and several other frontline receiving
states argued against the British proposal to delete Article 1(F)(b), but not
because they sought to uphold the primacy of extradition treaties. For
these countries, which relied on the refugee definition to decide who
should be admitted to residence in their territories, there was a principled
belief that unpunished common criminals were "not worthy" of protec-
tion.93 France insisted that the Convention must allow asylum countries to
"screen the refugees entering their territories"94 in order to exclude fugi-
tives from justice "who did not yet enjoy refugee status."95 Because "in the
present state of affairs, there was no international court of justice compe-
tent to try war criminals or violations of common law already dealt with by
national legislation,"96 the absence of such a screening tool would make it
politically and socially untenable to continue granting asylum to all refu-
gees. The relative precision of the French delegation's concern made it
possible for the British representative to withdraw his proposal to delete
Article 1(F)(b). Because the French government's objectives could be met
by text that would not open the door to abusive exclusion decisions, which
the British representative feared the bald reference to the Universal Declara-
tion might have done,97 he could agree to a more carefully defined
89. Id. at 14 (statement of Baron van Boetzelaer of the Netherlands).
90. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/1, Mar. 12, 1951, art. 1(E).
91. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/74, July 13, 1951.
92. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 21 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom).
93. Id. at 14 (statement of Mr. Herment of Belgium).
94. Id. at 17 (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France).
95. Id. at 21 (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France); see also id. at 26 (statement of
Mr. Bozovic of Yugoslavia) ("He explained that his amendment embraced two concepts:
that of crimes committed outside the receiving country; and that of crimes committed
by persons who had not at the time acquired the status of refugee.").
96. Id. at 13 (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France).
97. Id. at 21 (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom) ("[W]hile he did not
regard the revised [text of Article 1(F)(b)] as entirely free from objection, [he] felt that it
at least removed his main objection to the text ... as originally drafted ....").
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approach to the exclusion of fugitives from justice.
Thus, the travaux suggest two distinct, but closely related rationales
for Article l(F)(b). For some countries, the primary concern was to avoid
the admission as refugees of persons who could not be tried for their
offenses in the asylum state. For others, the goal was to honor extradition
obligations despite intervening claims to refugee status. Proponents of
both perspectives agreed that because of the gravity of peremptory exclu-
sion, only crimes generally recognized as truly serious should be grounds
for exclusion. The net result is a consensus on the substantive ambit of
Article 1(F)(b) defined by three criteria: only crimes committed outside the
adjudicating state are relevant, those crimes must be justiciable, and the
crimes must meet a fairly exacting definition of gravity. In other words,
the drafters' differing perspectives on the primary purpose of Article
1(F)(b) did not prevent them from arriving at a clearly defined standard
for the peremptory exclusion of certain common criminals.
B. An Historically Grounded Approach to Application of Article 1(F)(b)
Interpreting the text in the light of the drafting record, the first requirement
for invocation of Article 1(F)(b) is therefore that the criminal allegation be
based on acts committed outside a country of refuge,98 whether in the
country of origin99 or in transit to the asylum state.' 00 As noted by the
Canadian representative prior to the vote on this clause, "the issue turned
on the temporal element, namely, whether a person had committed a crime
outside the territory of the receiving country before he had applied for the
status of refugee."' 0 Criminal activity in a state of refuge, on the other
hand, is appropriately adjudicated through due process of law,102 with
98. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
24th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24, at 13 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom) ("His particular preoccupation was that persons who committed
crimes in their country of refuge should not be excluded from the application of the
Convention."); see also Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees &
Stateless Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 16 (statement of Mr. Petren
of Sweden), 18 (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France), 24 (statement of Mr. Herment of
Belgium) (1951). The representative of Yugoslavia introduced the specific incorporation
of this principle. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless
Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 20.
99. Exclusion does not follow if the criminal law is subverted to attain a persecutory
end. As observed by Mr. Herment of Belgium:
[T]he Belgian delegation did not consider that the status of refugee could be
denied to a person simply because he had been convicted of a common law
offence in his country of origin. In any case, the countries of origin concerned,
and their methods of dispensing justice, were well enough known.
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 29th
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 14.
100. In response to a question from the conference president on this issue, the
Netherlands representative suggested that all crimes committed prior to admission to an
asylum country were relevant. Id. at 21-22.
101. Id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Chance of Canada); see also id. (statement of Mr.
Bozovic of Yugoslavia).
102. Id. at 24 (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom) ("[P]aragraph E would
cover any crime committed by a refugee abroad, and its provisions would cease to apply
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recourse to expulsion or return if the refugee is consequently found to pose
a risk to public safety. 10 3
Second, both rationales for the exclusion clause require that the crimi-
nal offense be justiciable in the country where it was committed. 10 4 Inso-
far as the claimant has served his or her sentence, been acquitted of the
charges, benefited from an amnesty, or otherwise met all obligations under
the criminal law of the country where the offense occurred, he or she
would not have avoided due process or be subject to extradition and should
therefore not be excluded from refugee status. As Paul Weis commented:
It is ... difficult to see why a person who before becoming a refugee, has
been convicted of a serious crime and has served his sentence, should for
ever be debarred from refugee status. Such a rule would seem to run
counter to the generally accepted principle of penal law that a person who
has been punished for an offence should suffer no further prejudice on
account of the offence committed.
10 5
Indeed, delegates to the Conference on Territorial Asylum agreed that the
criminality exclusion should bar only the claims of persons believed "still
liable to prosecution or punishment."
0 6
Third, as the British representative's comments make clear,10 7 the
drafters recognized the grave consequences of refusing to protect a person
at risk of persecution. They therefore agreed to constrain the scope of rele-
vant criminality in three ways.
Most fundamentally, they agreed that exclusion under Article 1(F)(b)
is warranted only if the asylum seeker committed an offense sufficiently
serious to justify his or her extradition from the asylum state to the country
where the offense took place.' 0 8 Whether or not extradition is actually
being sought, extradition law was considered the best standard to assess
the gravity of wrongdoing that renders an asylum seeker unworthy of refu-
gee status. 10 9 Because there was (and is) no international measure for seri-
ous forms of common criminality, the incorporation by reference of
domestic standards for extraditable criminality was thought the most credi-
ble means to define an offense of sufficient gravity. 110
The starting point for analysis is therefore extradition law's founda-
tional principle of double criminality.' 1 1 The reasons for this limitation
once the refugee had been assimilated into the country of asylum."); see also UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 1 153, at 36.
103. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 32, 33(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 174-76; see
also infra text accompanying notes 146-59.
104. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 36, at 291-92.
105. Paul Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 J. DU DRorr INT'L
928, 984-86 (1960).
106. Report of the United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum, Conference on Ter-
ritorial Asylum, art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12 (1977).
107. Supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
108. Supra text accompanying notes 90-97.
109. Infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
110. Infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
111. In S. v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, the High Court of New Zealand can-
vassed its own criminal law and the Penal Code of Sri Lanka before determining that
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are self-evident, viewed in relation to the narrower goal of Article 1(F)(b)-
avoiding conflicts with extradition treaties. Because an offense is the basis
for extradition only if the alleged act is criminal in both the state of refuge
and the state where it was committed,1 12 there is obviously no discordance
between refugee law and extradition law unless the conduct is within the
realm of extraditable offenses. But reliance on standards of extraditable
criminality also ensures that the integrity of refugee protection is not com-
promised by a perception that it shelters fugitives from justice. This is so
because an individual whose actions were not criminal where and when
committed is not a fugitive from justice. Also, if the criminality of the
actions is not echoed in the asylum country's criminal law, no grounds for
public outrage in the receiving state would exist.
But the drafters went further. Anxious to guard against exclusion from
refugee status based on an aberrational approach to extraditable criminal-
ity, the drafters limited the scope of relevant criminality to crimes1 13
within the usual realm of extraditable offenses. 1 14 In other words, recog-
nizing that not all countries define extraditable criminality in the same
way,11 5 the drafters erred on the side of conservative interpretation. Abso-
lute deference to any state's individuated understanding of extraditable
criminality was unacceptable, as the British delegate's comments to the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries make clear:
aggravated robbery was a "serious crime" for purposes of Article 1(F)(b) exclusion.
"[Tihe authority was well justified in reaching the conclusion that both in New Zealand
and Sri Lanka and the international community generally the conduct of the plaintiff...
would inevitably be regarded as serious." [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 301, 311 (H.C.), affd,
[1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 291 (C.A.).
112. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 319. There is general agreement that the
principle of double criminality is a requirement for extradition. GEOFF GILBERT, TRANS-
NATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHA-
NISMS 104-12 (1998). Contra Riley v. Australia (1985) 159 C.L.R. 1, 16 (Austl.) (Deane,
J.).
113. The French delegate, Mr. Rochefort, "pointed out that a crime was not the same
thing as a misdemeanour, and that the term 'crime', in the sense in which it was used in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, meant serious crimes." Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.29, at 18 (1951). This characterization is particularly important since the
clause's final language was based on the French formulation and translated to English.
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Text of Article i adopted by the Confer-
ence on 20 July 1951, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & State-
less Persons, Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/L.1/ADD.10, at 3 (1951).
114. In addition to the several references to avoiding conflict with extradition treaties,
supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text, the consensus in favor of the extradition stan-
dard is also clear from the response to UNHCR's observation at the Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries that its own statute was explicitly framed to "exclude[ ] from protection a
person 'in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has com-
mitte[d] a crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition ...."' Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.29, at 24 (1951) (statement of Mr. van Heuven Goedhart of UNHCR) (omis-
sion in original). The ensuing discussion took this standard as a point of reference, but
sought to constrain the breadth of extraditable crimes that would be relevant for pur-
poses of Article l(F)(b).
115. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 212 (1992).
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But what was meant by considering that a person fell within a category of
prosecutions?... As it stood ... clause (b) would include refugees who had
committed a crime, no matter how trivial... provided it was not a political
crime, and would thus automatically exclude them from the benefits of the
Convention. It must be obvious to all that such a proposition was
untenable. 11 6
In response, the Belgian representative noted that he "preferred the words
'serious crimes' . . . to mention of crimes 'covered by the provisions of
treaties of extradition'.. .. Some crimes in respect of which the offender
could be extradited were punishable by only three months' imprisonment,
and were obviously not serious."1 1 7 These remarks led the Swiss and
French delegations to propose a successful amendment, which allowed
exclusion on the grounds of extraditable criminality only where the offense
is generally recognized as "serious."11 8
Thus, even a crime that satisfies the double criminality standard will
not be a basis for exclusion under Article l(F)(b) if it reflects an aberra-
tional understanding of extraditable offenses.1 1 9 The crime must be com-
monly treated by states as the basis for extradition. 120 This limitation will
occasionally compromise the extradition-based goal of Article 1(F)(b), but
only to the extent necessary to honor the objective of excluding from refu-
gee status only those persons whose criminal conduct is generally agreed
to be grave.
Finally, if the crime committed outside the asylum country is serious
enough to fall within the usual range of extraditable offenses, whatever
exceptions the asylum state normally applies to extradition requests also
form an integral part of this standard for exclusion under Article l(F)(b).
As previously observed, the absence of a universal consensus on the defini-
tion of crimes that render a person unworthy of refugee status left the Con-
vention's drafters no option but to defer to the particularized
understandings of state parties.1 21 That understanding is defined in part
by reference to each country's catalogue of extraditable crimes.122 Yet the
catalogue of relevant offenses does note exhaust each country's definition
of serious criminality; the political offense exception and guarantees
against removal to face discriminatory prosecution or punishment override
116. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 11 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom).
117. Id. at 24 (statement of Mr. Herment of Belgium).
118. This amendment was suggested by the Swiss delegate, id. at 17 (statement of Mr.
Schfirch of Switzerland), and formally proposed by Mr. Rochefort of France, id. at 20.
119. Grahl-Madsen suggested that only the commission of an extraditable crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for several years justifies the application of Article 1(F)(b).
GRaHL-MADsEN, supra note 36, at 297.
120. UNHCR observes that "[r]ape, homicide, armed robbery, and arson are exam-
ples of offences which are likely to be considered serious in most States." UNHCR
Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 1 16.
121. Supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
122. Supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
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any categorical presumptions. 123
Because a government's internationally recognized definition of extra-
ditable criminality has two parts-a list of presumptively serious crimes,
qualified by exceptions that identify inappropriate circumstances for extra-
dition-refugee law should not defer to a partial understanding of extradit-
able criminality. Although refugee law permits each state to resort to its
own understandings of extraditable criminality, insisting that each govern-
ment apply a complete definition ensures a holistic standard of serious
criminality. Just as an individual who committed a crime on the list of
extraditable offenses is not considered a fugitive from justice if the political
offense exception applies, an individual cannot logically be labeled unwor-
thy of refugee status for having committed a prima facie extraditable
offense in circumstances that the asylum state's own values deem insuffi-
cient for removal. 124
Most obviously, the express language of Article 1(F)(b) specifies that
peremptory exclusion is unwarranted if the crime is "political."125 Because
the objective is consistent of treatment by each state party of persons under
its authority, not uniformity of approach among states, the range of rele-
vant considerations varies from state to state. Depending on the scope of
the political offense exception in the asylum country, Article l(F)(b) may
operate to deny exclusion for pure political offenses, delits politiques abso-
lus, or for relative political offenses, delits politiques relatifs, or both.126 Rel-
ative political offenses may include both complex political offenses, delits
politiques complexes, and acts deemed sufficiently connected to an act
against the political order, delits politiques connexes. In essence, the extradi-
123. Through implementation of the political offense exception to extradition, a state
effectively asserts that certain humanitarian or political values are sufficiently important
to trump another country's interest in criminal prosecution or punishment. The state
invoking the political offense exception refuses to cooperate with the requesting state on
the grounds that it will not be a party to an exercise of authority that it views as illegiti-
mate. In this sense, the political offense exception implicitly states an understanding of
the fundamental limits to criminal law authority. Not even international comity in the
administration of criminal justice can be invoked to defeat the independent right of each
state to determine and assert these principled limits. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Politi-
cal Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRoIuSM AND
PoLrncAL CreMES 398, 444 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975).
124. "State practice vests the decision about the 'political' nature of the defendant's
crime with the requested State who has custody of the offender.... The typical 'political
offence' treaty exception is left purposefully vague. It therefore allows the requested
party to determine unilaterally what constitutes a 'political offence.'" WILLIAM SLOMAN-
SON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAv 213-14 (2d ed. 1995).
125. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. l(F)(b), 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
126. Pure political offenses are those crimes squarely directed against the political
order-treason, sedition, and perhaps espionage. Relative political offenses involve acts
with a mix of political and private interests, thus raising the need to decide the "true
nature" of the offense. Whether a crime is a relative political offense may focus, for
example, on considerations of remoteness and proportionality of means to end. See
GILBERT, supra note 112, at 217-46.
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tion laws of most states require that the crime be an ordinary offense, 127
prosecuted and punished in a nondiscriminatory way.
Importantly, this duty to grant refugees the benefit of domestic under-
standings of the political offense exception does not mean that govern-
ments are duty-bound to admit all refugees who have engaged in or
facilitated acts of violence. To the contrary, states have shown themselves
increasingly committed to accepting a restricted approach to the political
offense exception for the express purpose of promoting transnational
efforts to deter violence. While the political offense exception has been
applied in the past with little consistency, 128 a discernible tendency exists
today to redefine the political offense exception to exclude various violent
acts. State parties to the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism (European Terrorism Convention), for example, agreed to
exclude certain acts from the political offense exception, inter alia, "an
offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful
detention," and "an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers per-
sons."129 The 1996 European Union Convention Relating to Extradition
Between the Member States goes further, abolishing the political offense
exception altogether for extraditions between EU governments. 130 As the
EU further evolves toward a federal entity, this process is likely to
intensify.13 1
Outside the European context, however, many states remain reluctant
to abandon the political offense exception. 132 At best, they define certain
particularly violent offenses as beyond the scope of political justification.
For example, governments that have adhered to the United Nations Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist
127. See, e.g., Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless
Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.29, at 17 (1951) (statements of Mr.
Bozovic of Yugoslavia and Mr. Rochefort of France).
128. "In the past, political offence decisions have been based upon whether the fugi-
tive was from the former Soviet bloc, whether the requesting State was an ally, support
for the fugitive or his group in the requested State, even economic interests." GILBERT,
supra note 112, at 205.
129. European Terrorism Convention, supra note 43, art. 1(d)-(e); see also Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, done Oct. 15, 1975, Europ. T.S. No.
86.
130. Art. 5, 1996 OJ. (C 313) 2; see G. Vermeulen & T. Vander Beken, New Conven-
tions on Extradition in the European Union: Analysis and Evaluation, 15 DIcK. J. INT'L L.
265, 276 (1996); Renuka E. Rao, Note, Protecting Fugitives' Rights While Ensuring the
Prosecution and Punishment of Criminals: An Examination of the New EU Extradition
Treaty, 21 B.C. INrr'L & CoNtP. L. REv. 229 passim (1998).
131. TREATY OF AMsTERDAM art. 29; see also Action Plan of the Council and Commis-
sion on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of
Freedom, Justice and Security, 1999 OJ. (C 19) 1. Protocol 29 to the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community clarifies that the intention is to regard all Member States
as "safe" for refugee- and asylum-law purposes. Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of
Member States of the European Union, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 173.
132. "The main obstacle vill always be obtaining international agreement to amend
and restrict the exemption: its liberality is deeply-rooted in historic-legal 'folklaw.'" GIL.-
BERT, supra note 112, at 329.
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Bombing Convention) agree not to apply the political offense exception to
deny the extradition of persons who "unlawfully and intentionally
deliver[], place[], discharge[ ] or detonate[ ] an explosive or other lethal
device" against listed targets. 133 Any state party to the Terrorist Bombing
Convention that incorporates into its domestic law and practice the rele-
vant exclusions to the political offense exception may therefore invoke Arti-
cle 1(F)(b) of the Refugee Convention to deny protection to asylum seekers
believed to have committed acts outside the narrowed scope of the political
offense exception. 134 The Terrorist Bombing Convention's adoption exem-
plifies how new understandings of criminal exclusion under international
refugee law evolve automatically to account for comparable commitments
to grant extradition. 135
Even as states narrow the breadth of the classic political offense excep-
tion, however, they have simultaneously embraced a duty not to extradite
persons that face seriously discriminatory applications of criminal law
authority. This limitation on the duty to extradite is incorporated in both
the European Terrorism Convention 136 and the United Nations Terrorist
Financing Convention:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite.. ., if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believ-
ing that the request for extradition ... has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion,
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the
request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these
reasons.
13 7
Thus, an individual does not face true criminal prosecution where relevant
forms of discrimination result in selective prosecution, denial of procedu-
ral or adjudicative fairness, or differential punishment.138 The symmetri-
133. Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 9(1), 37 I.L.M. at 253, 256.
134. Nonetheless, resort to the political offense exception is not entirely prohibited.
Id. art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 257.
135. In Benbrahim Boudriah, for example, the Belgian refugee agency excluded an
Algerian supporter of the Front islamique du salut who knowingly encouraged and facili-
tated terrorist attacks. It found the applicant ineligible to claim the political offense
exception because Belgium had opted to exclude hostage-taking, aircraft hijacking, and
terrorism from the scope of the exception. There is no double standard under this sym-
metrical approach; Belgium was entitled to impose exclusion because the acts of the asy-
lum seeker were within the scope of legitimate criminality as measured against the very
standards asserted by Belgium in the exercise of its authority to deny extradition. Bel-
gian Commission permanente de recours des rdfugids, Decision No. 94/993/R2632
(Mar. 28, 1995). Similarly, as a state party to the European Terrorism Convention, the
Government of the Netherlands could refuse to recognize any crime listed in that treaty
as "political" for the purposes of interpreting Article l(F)(b) of the Refugee Convention.
Netherlands Policy Statement, supra note 60. The same communication, however, also
purported to declare acts contrary to the U.N. 1997 Terrorism Declaration outside the
scope of Article 1(F)(b). Id. Unless the Netherlands made a parallel commitment with
regard to its extradition jurisdiction, this additional qualification would not conform to
the purposes of Article l(F)(b).
136. Supra note 43, arts. 1, 7.
137. Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 45, art. 14, 39 I.L.M. at 276.
138. HATHAWAY, supra note 36, at 176-79.
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cal logic of Article 1(F)(b) provides the basis for arguing that emergent
exceptions to extradition should be automatically incorporated in Article
1(F)(b) analysis, on the same basis as the more traditional political offense
exception.1 39
In practical terms, it will be easiest to apply these principles for Article
l(F)(b) exclusion where an extradition treaty actually exists between the
country where the crime was committed and the asylum state. Whatever
special protections or limitations thought appropriate in a particular bilat-
eral or multilateral setting should logically apply in assessing exclusion
under Article l(F)(b) within that same context. The only caveat, in line
with the drafters' intentions to avoid exclusion on the grounds of an aberra-
tional understanding of extraditable criminality,140 is that refugees should
not be excluded under Article l(F)(b) where a particular extradition rela-
tionship provides seriously deficient protections as measured against gen-
erally prevailing norms.
Where no extradition arrangement exists between the asylum state
and the country where the crime was committed, only the more general
goal of Article l(F)(b) to avoid a loss of public confidence by the admission
of unpunished criminals is relevant. The asylum country should therefore
apply its general standards of both extraditable criminality and the politi-
cal offense exception and other limitations on extradition. Those stan-
dards are the best measure of the circumstances in which the citizenry of
the receiving state would see insufficient grounds to justify the asylum
seeker's removal.
This extradition-based approach to the definition of criminal conduct
for purposes of peremptory exclusion under Article 1(F)(b) not only is his-
torically justified but also represents a fair compromise between the gen-
eral duty to protect persons at risk of persecution and the importance of
excluding from refugee status fugitives from justice. Each government has
the power to commit itself to new standards of international or extraditable
criminality, thereby automatically expanding the range of relevant crimes
for peremptory exclusion purposes. 141 The standard is flexible, yet
explicit and verifiable. But insistence on formal standards of extraditable
criminality provides a check on arbitrary action by establishing a clearly
defined and externally conceived standard for the power to exclude. 142
139. The decision of the Netherlands Council of State in Folkerts v. State-Secretary of
Justice explicitly recognizes the conceptual linkage between these limitations on extradi-
tion authority and the duty of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention. Afdeling
Rechtspraak van de Raad van State [Afd. Rechtspr.], 26 oktober 1978, ARB 78, 74 I.L.R.
472, 474-76 (Neth. Council of State 1978).
140. Supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
141. Where a court reviewing a refugee status decision also has extradition authority,
its findings for Article 1(F)(b) of the Refugee Convention may have similar effect. E.g.,
T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. 742 (1995) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
142. "The a priori denial of the fundamental protections of a treaty whose purpose is
the protection of human rights is a drastic exception to the purposes of the [Refugee]
Convention ... and can only be justified where the protection of those rights is fur-
thered by the exclusion." Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1035 (Can.).
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Thus, the linkage between Article 1(F)(b) and extradition law avoids
the possibility of a double standard by prohibiting governments from
excluding a person from refugee status under Article 1(F)(b) based on facts
they would judge insufficient to justify extradition. Article I(F) essentially
imposes a requirement of ethical symmetry, where a state may not hold a
person inherently undeserving of refugee status if it would insist on the
right to withhold the extradition of a comparably situated person.
V. Asylum-State Safety and Security: Article 33(2)
Our analysis thus far has sought to clarify why peremptory exclusion
under Article I(F) is defined by categorical norms rather than concerns
about asylum-state safety and security. In some circumstances, Article
I(F) will serve as a means for states in practice to advance their security
interests by excluding a subset of asylum seekers believed to have commit-
ted or facilitated acts of violence. In addition to the categories of persons
excluded under subsections (a) and (c)-for example, refugee claimants
who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, hijacking, or
attacks on diplomats-Article l(F)(b) ensures that there is no need even to
consider the refugee claims of most persons who have not been prosecuted
and punished for serious common crimes committed abroad.
But because the purpose of Article I(F) is to identify inherently
unworthy asylum seekers, not protecting the asylum country, it is true that
our understanding of Article l(F)(b) denies governments the right of per-
emptory exclusion for other asylum seekers who have committed or facili-
tated acts of violence. Specifically, those claimants whose criminal
conduct took place in the asylum state, whose crimes abroad are no longer
justiciable, or who would not meet the general test for extraditable crimi-
nality cannot be excluded under Article 1(F)(b). While those persons may
have a violent past of concern to asylum countries, asylum states may not
deny refugee status on that basis. As Lord Mustill observed in the House
of Lords decision in T. v. Home Secretary,
I am quite unable to see how the fact, if it is a fact, that the foreign crime
shows the asylum seeker to be a wicked man of whom the country of refuge
would be well rid can have any bearing on this question [of the interpreta-
tion of Article l(F)(b)]. Indeed the shape of the legislation shows that this is
not so, for article 1F(b) of the [Refugee] Convention assumes that a person
who has committed a serious crime, which might make him just as unwel-
come in the country of refuge, is immune from refoulement so long as his
offence can be characterised as political.
Moreover, the argument overlooks article 33(2) of the Convention .... The
state of refuge has sufficient means to protect itself against harbouring dan-
gerous criminals without forcing on an offence, which either is or is not a
political crime when and where committed, a different character according
to the opinions of those in the receiving state about whether the refugee is an
undesirable alien: opinions which may be shaped by considerations which
have nothing to do with the political nature of the offence committed
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elsewhere. 143
This judgment succinctly states the complementary roles of Article
1(F) and Article 33(2). Article 1(F) was inserted at the insistence of coun-
tries that perceived themselves as vulnerable to large inflows of refu-
gees. 14 4 It is designed to afford the possibility of preadmission exclusion
based on a relatively low standard of proof-"serious reasons for consider-
ing"14 5-and without recourse to formal procedures to assess the criminal
charge. The comparatively narrow scope of this recourse balances its expe-
diency; it applies only to persons believed to have committed international
crimes or pre-entry common crimes that are justiciable and sufficiently
serious to justify extradition. Concerns about asylum-state safety and
security are instead vindicated by reliance on Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention, 146 the original and more broadly applicable criminality provi-
sion.14 7 If the asylum country is not concerned about the inherent unwor-
thiness of an asylum seeker but rather the promotion of particularized
safety or security concerns, refugee status assessment should proceed as
usual. But refoulement is nonetheless authorized if the refugee presents a
risk to national security, or alternatively if his or her final conviction for a
particularly serious crime justifies a finding of risk to the asylum-state
community. If either test is met, Article 33(2) allows state parties to expel
or return dangerous refugees, including those whose crimes were commit-
ted in the asylum state, who have served their sentence or otherwise acquit-
ted themselves of criminal liability, or who would be entitled to invoke a
recognized extradition exception.
Justice Bastarache of the Supreme Court of Canada also recognized
the distinctiveness of Article 1(F)(b) and Article 33(2):
[P]ersons falling within Article IF of the Convention are automatically
excluded from the protections of the [Convention]. Not only may they be
143. [1996] A.C. at 711 (Mustill, L.J.) (citation omitted).
144. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
24th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24, at 13 (1951) (statement of Mr. Rochefort of
France) ("France's reason for taking such a firm stand on the subject lay in the fact that
she had to administer the right of asylum under much more difficult conditions than did
countries which were in a position to screen immigrants carefully at their frontiers."); see
also id. at 18 (statement of Mr. Makiedo of Yugoslavia). These states also did not want
to undermine the possibilities for resettlement of admitted refugees. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 19th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.19, at 7 (1951) (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France) ("If refugee status
vas to be granted to criminals, immigration countries could not fail to question its
value.").
145. GRmaL-MADsEN, supra note 36, at 289.
146. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
147. Indeed, the United Kingdom argued that there was no need for a criminality
exclusion clause in Article I(F) in view of Article 33(2). Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 24th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24, at
4 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom); see also Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 29th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.29, at 12 (1951) (statement of Baron von Boetzelaer of the Netherlands)
("Common criminals should not enjoy the right of asylum; but that consideration had
already been taken care of in article 133] of the draft Convention . ").
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returned to the country from which they have sought refuge without any
determination ... that they pose a threat to public safety or national secur-
ity, but their substantive claim to refugee status will not be considered. The
practical implications of such an automatic exclusion, relative to the safe-
guards of the [Article 33(2)] procedure, are profound.148
In particular, the evidentiary standard for denying protection under
Article 33(2), "reasonable grounds," is higher than that for exclusion under
Article 1(F)(b), "serious reasons for considering." The English Court of
Appeal ruled that the more demanding standard of proof under Article
33(2) means that the assertion of risk must be "sufficiently particularised"
to substantiate the reasonableness of exclusion. 14 9 A court applying Arti-
cle 33(2) must satisfy itself that the grounds for holding a refugee to be a
risk are reasonable before protection against refoulement may be validly
denied.' 5 0
Equally important, Article 33(2) does not annul refugee status, but
simply authorizes a host government to divest itself of its particularized
protective responsibilities. The individual in question remains a refugee
and is therefore entitled to UNHCR assistance and the protection of any
other state party where the refugee's presence does not infringe the state's
safety and security.
So construed, Article 1(F)(b) and Article 33(2) form a coherent and
logical system. A state may deny a person refugee status under Article
1(F)(b) if admission as a refugee would result in the protection of an indi-
vidual who has not expiated serious criminal acts. While this result may
appear harsh, it is the only means available to ensure that refugee law does
not benefit fugitives from justice.1 5 1 Because ordinary crimes cannot nor-
mally be prosecuted in any country other than the country where they were
committed, any response short of excluding common-law criminals from
the refugee protection system would undermine both the symbolic and
practical goals of Article l(F)(b). 152 If, on the other hand, the concern is
not the avoidance of criminal responsibility, but instead protection of the
host state and its citizenry, there is no need to deny refugee status. To
quote once more from the Supreme Court of Canada's Pushpanathan
decision:
The purpose of Article 1 is to define who is a refugee. Article 1F then estab-
lishes categories of persons who are specifically excluded from that defini-
tion. The purpose of Article 33 of the Convention, by contrast, is not to
define who is and who is not a refugee, but rather to allow for the refoule-
ment of a bonafide refugee to his or her native country where he or she poses
a danger to the security of the country of refuge, or to the safety of the com-
munity.... Thus, the general purpose of Article IF is not the protection of
148. Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982,
999-1000 (Can.).
149. "NSH" v. Home Sec'y, [1988] Imm. A.R. 389, 393, 395-96 (Eng. C.A.).
150. Id.
151. Removal may nonetheless be prohibited by countervailing norms of human
rights law. Infra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
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the society of refuge from dangerous refugees, whether because of acts com-
mitted before or after the presentation of a refugee claim; that purpose is
served by Article 33 of the Convention.15 3
A. Danger to National Security
The first category of persons legitimately subject to refoulement under Arti-
cle 33(2) comprises those "whom there are reasonable grounds for regard-
ing as a danger to the security of the [receiving] country .... ,"154 While
the travaux prdparatoires do not precisely define national security, there
are indications that delegates to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries were
particularly concerned about the possibility of Communist infiltration.15 5
More generally, however, there is little controversy that national security is
at risk where the asylum seeker's actions precipitate a fundamental threat
against the asylum state.15 6
The major area of controversy for the national security leg of Article
33(2) involves refugees who promote violence against a foreign government
not capable of or likely to retaliate against the asylum state. Article 33(2)
authorizes refoulement only for a refugee "whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he
is . . . *"157 This fairly precise phrasing suggests the illegality of refoule-
ment unless the refugee's actions endanger asylum-state security, not that
153. Pushpanathan, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 1024.
154. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
155. It must be borne in mind that... each government had become more keenly
aware of the current dangers to its national security. Among the great mass of
refugees it was inevitable that some persons should be tempted to engage in
activities on behalf of a foreign Power against the country of their asylum, and it
would be unreasonable to expect the latter not to safeguard itself against such a
contingency.
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 8 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United
Kingdom).
In drafting [Article 33], members of [the Ad Hoc] Committee had kept their eyes
on the stars but their feet on the ground. Since that time, however, the interna-
tional situation had deteriorated, and it must be recognised, albeit with reluc-
tance, that at present many governments would find difficulty in accepting
unconditionally the principle [of non-refoulement].
Id. at 8-9 (statement of Mr. Chance of Canada).
156. In the circumstances, and for the purposes of this case, we adopt the posi-
tion that a person may be said to offend against national security if he engages
in, promotes, or encourages violent activity which is targeted at the UK, its sys-
tem of government or its people. This includes activities directed against the
overthrow or destabilisation of a foreign government if that foreign government
is likely to take reprisals against the UK which affect the security of the UK or of
its nationals. National security extends also to situations where UK citizens are
targeted, wherever they may be.
Rehman v. Home Sec'y, [1999] INLR 517, 528 (Special Immig. App. Comm'n) (Potts, J.).
In the Court of Appeal, this view was characterized as "a narrow interpretation." Home
Sec'y v. Rehman, [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1240, 1251 (Eng. C.A.).
157. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176 (emphasis
added).
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of some other country.15 8 Yet the Canadian Federal Court recently
defended a nearly unlimited government right to define the scope of their
national security relevant to the removal of Convention refugees. 15 9
In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the court ordered
the removal from Canada of a Sri Lankan Tamil, whose refugee status had
been formally recognized, upholding a security-based certificate of inad-
missibility issued because the refugee had engaged in fundraising and pro-
curement of material to support the allegedly terrorist activities of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.160 Rejecting the need for evidence of any
risk to Canada or Canadians, the court found that "the 'security of Canada'
cannot be limited to instances where the personal safety of Canadians is
concerned. It should logically extend to instances where the integrity of
Canada's international relations and obligations are affected."1 6 1 Because
"[t]he efficacy of those collective efforts is undermined each time a nation
provides terrorist organizations with a window of opportunity to operate
offshore," removal from Canada on national security grounds was found
justified.162
While it seems right that a state's national security may be implicated
by actions of a refugee that, while focused abroad in a direct and immedi-
ate sense, nonetheless rebound to the serious detriment of host-state secur-
ity, the Canadian court's approach goes too far. In line with the general
evidentiary standard of Article 33(2),163 the connection between an impact
on "the integrity of Canada's international relations" and Canada's essen-
tial welfare should have been proved, not simply assumed.
The English Court of Appeal adopted a more balanced approach in
Home Secretary v. Rehman. 164 The court was reviewing a decision to
deport an individual otherwise entitled to indefinite leave to remain in the
United Kingdom, but found to have raised funds for the Mujahedin operat-
ing in Pakistan and organized training in England for Mujahedin fighters
allegedly engaged in terrorist acts in the Indian sub-continent. 165 The
158. The German Federal Constitutional Court has determined that nonviolent sup-
port for a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activities is insufficient for exclu-
sion from refugee status. Federal Constitutional Court, Decision No. 2 BvR 126/94
(Oct. 13, 1994); see also Federal Constitutional Court, Decision No. 9C 276/94 Uan. 10,
1995). In contrast, where a Turkish Kurd committed to the secession of Kurdistan from
Turkey engaged in physical violence against his political opponents residing in Ger-
many, the duty of protection could legitimately be raised. BVerfGE 81, 142 (F.R.G.).
159. The court held that the phrase "danger to the security of Canada" should be
informed by the provisions of the Immigration Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act. Generally stated, the purpose of this legislation is to exclude from Canada
persons who are or were members of a terrorist organization and who may engage in
nefarious activities either in Canada or abroad using Canada as a base. Suresh v. Minis-
ter of Citizenship & Immigration, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 629, 671 (Can. Fed. Ct. 2000) (cita-
tion omitted).
160. Id. at 629, 631-35.
161. Id. at 671.
162. Id. at 672.
163. See supra text accompanying text notes 149-50.
164. [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1240 (Eng. C.A.).
165. Id.
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judgment shares many of the Canadian court's concerns about interna-
tional cooperation in the eradication of violence, 166 but nonetheless insists
on evidence of a threat to the host state before its national security can be
found threatened.
Specifically, the court recognized the possibility that the promotion of
violence abroad endangered national security, but only where there is a
"real possibility" of "adverse repercussions on the security of this
country."16 7
"In alleged terrorist cases, a person may be said to be a danger to the United
Kingdom's national security if he or she engages in, promotes or encourages
violent activity which has, or is likely to have, adverse repercussions on the
security of the United Kingdom, its system of government or its people."168
This approach helpfully transposes the notion of national security to a
social context different from that contemplated by the drafters of the Refu-
gee Convention without losing sight of the essential purpose of individual-
ized refoulement-the protection of the host state's most essential
interests-and without compromising the relatively demanding evidentiary
standard of Article 33(2).
B. Danger to the Asylum State's Community
Beyond the relatively small number of cases where a refugee's presence
poses a risk to national security, Article 33(2) also authorizes refoulement
for refugees who have been "convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime" and who are found to constitute "a danger to the commu-
nity" of the asylum state.169 The threshold standard of relevant criminality
is more flexibly defined than under Article 1(F)(b), but is pitched at a
166. The court quoted with approval from the Home Office note filed before the Spe-
cial Immigration Appeals Commission.
Whatever may have been the position in the past, increasingly the security of
one country is dependent upon the security of other countries. That is why this
country has entered into numerous alliances. They acknowledge the extent to
which this country's security is dependent upon the security of other
countries....
"An important part of the Government's strategy to protect the U.K. and
U.K. citizens and interests abroad from the terrorist threat is to foster co-
operation between states in combating terrorist groups, whatever their
objectives. The U.K. can only expect other states to take measures to com-
bat terrorists who target the U.K. or U.K. citizens if the U.K., for its part,
reciprocates by combating terrorists who target states other than the U.K.
It cannot be predicted when such ties of reciprocity may prove to be critical
to protecting national security from, e.g., a terrorist bombing campaign. It
is therefore essential in the interests of national security that the U.K. fos-
ters such ties with as many states as possible now, against the day when
any of them may be able to act directly to safeguard the U.K.'s security
interests (whether by taking measures against terrorists in their own terri-
tory, or by providing the U.K. with intelligence about proposed terrorist
activity)."
Id. at 1251-52; see also Terrorism Act, 2000, ch. 11 (Eng.).
167. Id. at 1253 (emphasis added).
168. Id. (quoting a definition of national security from counsel for amicus curiae).
169. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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higher level of gravity. While Article 1(F)(b) requires a "serious" crime,
Article 33(2) authorizes refoulement only if the crime is "particularly seri-
ous." The drafters did not view this test as met where, for example, a refu-
gee repeatedly engages in relatively minor forms of criminality. 170
Logically, refoulement under Article 33(2) should be considered only
where the crimes usually defined as "serious"-for example, rape, homi-
cide, armed robbery, and arson 171-are committed with aggravating fac-
tors, or at least without significant mitigating circumstances.
Second, refoulement based on the security interests of the host commu-
nity is permissible only where there has been conviction by a final judg-
ment. Appeal rights should have expired or been exhausted, 172 thereby
limiting the risk of refoulement strictly to those whose criminality has been
definitively established in accordance with prevailing legal norms. Because
the language of Article 33(2) restricts particularized refoulement to those
refugees whose criminal liability has been clearly established, states
should take particular care to ensure that convictions registered outside the
asylum country resulted from a procedure that satisfied basic standards of
fairness.
Third and finally, the nature of the conviction and other circum-
stances must justify the conclusion that the refugee constitutes a danger to
the community from which he or she seeks protection. 173 Because the
danger flows from the refugee's criminal character, it does not matter
whether the crime was committed in the state of origin, an intermediate
state, or the asylum state. 174 Also, it is not relevant whether the refugee
has served a penal sentence or otherwise been punished. But in contrast to
170. The United Nations rejected a proposal to authorize refoulement for habitual
offenders convicted of a series of less serious crimes. Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at
16-17 (1951) (statements of Mr. Theodoli and Mr. Hoare); see also Supreme Administra-
tive Court of Finland, Decision No. 673 (Feb. 19, 1988), available at http://
www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/refcas/hcr0134.htm.
171. UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, cl 16.
172. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 14 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom).
173. On its proper construction, Art 33(2) does not contemplate that a crime will
be characterised as particularly serious or not particularly serious merely by
reference to the nature of the crime that has been committed although this may
suffice in some cases. The reason is that there are very many crimes where it is
just not possible to determine whether they are particularly serious without
regard to the circumstances surrounding their commission.
Betkoshabeh v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 157 A.L.R. 95,
100 (Austl. Fed. Ct.). In a subsequent judicial review after reconsideration of the origi-
nal decision to exclude, Betkoshabeh was ordered removed from Australia because the
grounds for his fear of persecution had ceased to exist. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs v. Betkhoshabeh (1999) 55 A.L.D. 609 (Austl. Fed. Ct.).
174. Moreover, the possibility of a refugee committing a crime in a country other
than his country of origin or his country of asylum could not be ignored. No
matter where a crime was committed, it reflected upon the personality of the
guilty individual, and the perpetrator was always a criminal....
The President pointed out that paragraph 2 [of Article 33] afforded a safe-
guard for States, by means of which they could rid themselves of common
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exclusion from refugee status under Article 1(F)(b) of the Convention, par-
ticularized refoulement cannot be based on the refugee's criminality per
se.175 Refoulement is instead authorized only where genuinely necessary to
protect the asylum-state community from an unacceptably high risk of
harm.176
Thus, the practice of some states to give dangerous refugees the option
of indefinite incarceration in the asylum state as an alternative to refoule-
ment is one mechanism that should be considered. 17 7 Article 33 should
moreover be read in consonance with Articles 31 and 32 to allow danger-
ous refugees the opportunity to seek entry into a nonpersecutory state,
rather than face return to their home country.' 7 8 The Convention drafters
hoped that even dangerous refugees would not be sent to a country where
persecution awaited them.' 79 The position finally adopted nonetheless
recognizes that in extreme cases, general considerations of humanity
criminals or persons who had been convicted of particularly serious crimes in
other countries.
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 35th
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35, at 24 (1951) (statements of Mr. Rochefort of France
and Mr. Larsen of Denmark).
175. See, e.g., Netherlands/F.V., HR, 13 meI 1988, NJ 910, 20 NErH. Y.B. INT'L L. 329.
This case involved a Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seeker who served a prison sentence for
possession of 3.72 grams of heroin, at the end of which the state applied for deportation
based on his narcotics conviction. In considering the scope of Article 33(2), the court
held that
the provision that anyone who has committed a particularly serious crime can-
not claim the benefit of the prohibition in paragraph 1 is based on the notion
that he constitutes a danger to the community of the country of residence. It
follows that the question whether there has been a particularly serious crime in
the abovementioned sense should be answered not in the abstract but by refer-
ence to the specific details of the case itself, including in particular the view of
the court on the gravity of the crime committed, as evidenced by the sentence
imposed.
Id. c1 3.2.1, 20 NErH. Y.B. ITr'L L. at 331. In contrast, a French tribunal purported to
withdraw protection from a Sri Lankan refugee convicted of a serious narcotics offense
in France on the grounds that the penalty set in the criminal case, which included expul-
sion from France, must be viewed as a particularly serious criminal offense that gives
rise to a French national security risk. Nagasamy Sivanadiyan, French Commission des
recours des rdfugi0s, Decision No. 261376 (Apr. 24, 1995).
176. ITjhe Swiss Government wished to reserve the right in quite exceptional cir-
cumstances to expel an undesirable alien, even if he was unable to proceed to a
country other than the one from which he had fled, since the Federal Govern-
ment might easily find itself so placed that there was no other means of getting
rid of an alien who had seriously compromised himself.
U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 40th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/
AC.32/SR.40, at 32 (1950) (statement of Mr. Schfirch of Switzerland).
177. The Convention drafters, however, assumed this option was no better than
refoulement. "To condemn such persons to lifelong imprisonment, even if that were a
practicable course, would be no better solution." Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 8
(statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom).
178. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951, at 343 (Paul Weis, 1995).
179. The Chairman realized that the presence of particularly intractable refugees
might cause certain difficulties in certain reception countries. Nevertheless, it
was for the governments of those countries to find the means of making reserva-
tions to meet special cases, while accepting the principle, which applied to all
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should yield to the reasonable expectations of asylum-state safety. 180
Thus, if the demanding criteria of Article 33(2) are satisfied, an asylum
state may, as a last resort, remove a dangerous refugee even to his or her
country of origin.
C. No Need to "Balance" Risk to the Refugee
By authorizing states to engage in refoulement only where there are reason-
able grounds to believe that a refugee poses a security risk or where a refu-
gee convicted of a particularly serious crime is shown to be a danger to the
host community, the drafters effectively balanced refugee and communal
rights in Article 33(2). If compelling evidence exists that the refugee is a
danger to asylum-state security or safety of the community of that country,
there is no additional proportionality requirement to satisfy. By definition,
no purely individuated risk of persecution can offset a threat to the vital
security interests of the receiving state. Because the objective of Article
33(2) is protecting the host state and its community, a risk to important
collective interests defeats the refugee's right to invoke protection against
refoulement. Refugee law does not require the application of a proportion-
ality test once the enumerated standards are met.
Most scholars disagree, 1" basing the need for a balancing test largely
on the comment of the British cosponsor of Article 33(2) that "[i]t must be
left to States to decide whether the danger entailed to refugees by expulsion
outweighed the menace to public security that would arise if they were
permitted to stay." 18 2 Yet the British emphasis on letting states weigh rela-
tive risks was actually a response to a proposal to restrict states' margin of
appreciation,' 8 3 not an argument for a superadded proportionality test.
Indeed, the British representative associated himself with his French cos-
ponsor's explanation of the rationale for the particularized refoulement
clause:
civilized nations, of not expelling refugees to territories where they would meet
certain death.
U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 20th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/
AC.32/SR.20, at 15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Chance of Canada).
180. "A State would always be in a position to protect itself against refugees who
constituted a danger to national security or public order." Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/
SR.16, at 5 (1951) (statement of Msgr. of Mr. Comte of the Holy See).
181. E.g., GOODWIN-GiLL, supra note 10, at 139-40; RoBINSON, supra note 22, at 124;
THE REFUGEE CONVENrlON, 1951, supra note 178, at 342.
182. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 8 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom).
183. "What was meant for example by the words 'reasonable grounds'? He consid-
ered that the wording: 'may not, however, be claimed by a refugee who constitutes a dan-
ger to the security of the country' would be preferable." Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at
7-8 (1951) (statement of Msgr. Comte of the Holy See).
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The French and United Kingdom delegations had submitted their amend-
ment in order to make it possible for states to punish activities ... directed
against national security or constituting a danger to the community....
The right of asylum rested on moral and humanitarian considerations
which were freely recognised by receiving countries, but it had certain essen-
tial limitations. A country could not contract an unconditional obligation
towards persons over whom it was difficult to exercise any control, and into
the ranks of whom undesirable elements might well infiltrate. The problem
was a moral and psychological one, and in order to solve it, it would be
necessary to take into account the possible reactions of public opinion. 18 4
This conviction that the establishment and maintenance of a relatively
open refugee protection system required a strong safeguard for the basic
security interests of receiving states led the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
to reject the Ad Hoc Committee's unconditional insistence on strict obser-
vance of non-refoulement.-8 5
Moreover, while advocacy of a proportionality test before applying
Article 33(2) is superficially humane, it may work in practice against a
liberal view of the duty to protect refugees. Because of the implicit premise
that some individuated forms of harm could be more compelling than
national security or danger to the host community, a proportionality test
risks trivializing the significance of the latter two concepts. For example,
in holding that Article 33(2) mandated a "balancing test," the English
Court of Appeal authorized the government to construe relatively minor
concerns as matters of national security or communal danger:
[T]he Secretary of State argues that on the plain wording of the article a
refugee may be expelled or returned even to a country where his life or free-
dom would be threatened, and that no balancing exercise is necessary:
expulsion or return is permitted even where the threat to life or freedom is
much more serious than the danger to the security of the country.
... Despite the literal meaning of article 33, it would seem to me quite
wrong that some trivial danger to national security should allow expulsion or
return in a case where there was a present threat to the life of the refugee if
that took place.' 8 6
184. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons,
16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 7 (1951) (statement of Mr. Rochefort of
France).
185. The PRESIDENT thought that the Ad hoc Committee, in drafting article [33],
had, perhaps, established a standard which could not be accepted. That Com-
mittee, as could be seen from its report on its second session, had felt that the
principle inherent in article [33] was fundamental, and that it could not con-
sider any exceptions to the article.
Id. at 13 (statement of Mr. Larsen of Denmark).
186. Regina v. Home Sec'y ex parte Chahal, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 526, 533 (Eng. C.A.
1993) (Staughton, LJ.) (emphasis added). In an earlier case, the same court had
reasoned:
It may be that in many cases, particularly where a case is near the borderline,
the Secretary of State will weigh in the balance all the compassionate circum-
stances, including the fact that the person is a refugee, before reaching a final
conclusion. But where national security is concerned I do not see that there is
any legal requirement to take this course. Indeed article 33.2 of the Convention
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The notion that there could be such a thing as a "trivial danger to national
security" to balance against purely individuated interests is disturbing.
This decision illustrates how asserting the importance of a "balancing test"
inadvertently legitimates an unwarranted extension of the grounds for
refoulement. If, in contrast, national security and danger to the community
are appropriately and narrowly defined, they would always trump purely
individuated risks, and no additional balancing test is required.
VI. The Risks of the UNHCR's Alternative Interpretation
To this point, we have drawn upon the Refugee Convention's drafting his-
tory to demonstrate that Article 1(F) and Article 33(2) of the Refugee Con-
vention are intended to further two distinct goals, each of which has some
bearing on states' right to refuse protection to asylum seekers who have
advocated or engaged in violence. Specifically, the duty of peremptory
exclusion under Article 1(F)(b) applies only to persons who are fugitives
from domestic justice-their crimes must have been committed outside the
asylum state, remain justiciable, and justify a grant of extradition. The
right of particularized refoulement under Article 33(2), on the other hand,
entitles state parties to defend their most basic interests in safety and
security. Even if not a fugitive from justice, the refugee may be removed
from the country upon a showing that his or her presence endangers
national security or that established criminality justifies a finding of dan-
ger to the host community.
UNHCR, in contrast, argues that Article 1(F)(b) and Article 33(2) are
both mechanisms for protecting asylum-state interests.- 87 Specifically,
UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Sta-
tus (Handbook) states that Article 1(F)(b) is primarily a means of protect-
ing the interests of the asylum-country population:
The aim of this exclusion clause is to protect the community of a receiving
country from the danger of admitting a refugee who has committed a seri-
ous common crime. It also seeks to render due justice to a refugee who has
committed a common crime (or crimes) of a less serious nature or has com-
mitted a political offence. 188
While UNHCR is not alone in advocating an understanding of Article
1(F)(b) that focuses on protecting asylum-state interest, 189 its Handbook is
provides that a refugee cannot claim the benefit of article 33.1 where there are
reasonable grounds for regarding him "as a danger to the security of the country
in which he is."
"NSH" v. Home Sec'y, [1988] Imm. A.R. 389, 399 (Eng. C.A.). But the Chahal court
unfortunately rejected that view. Chahal, [1995] 1 W.L.R. at 533.
187. It is important to recall that the intention of [Article 1(F)(b)] is to reconcile
the aims of rendering due justice to a refugee ... and to protect the community
in the country of asylum from the danger posed by criminal elements fleeing
justice. This Article should be seen in parallel with Article 33 ....
UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 16.
188. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 3, '[ 151, at 36.
189. Guy Goodwin-Gill equivocates on this issue. He accurately notes that the
UNHCR position on Article l(F)(b) "leaves much to be desired... lilt suggests that
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likely the source of this interpretation 1 90 and has had immense influence
on state practice. 19 1 UNHCR, after all, is charged by the international
community with the responsibility of supervising the Refugee Conven-
tion, 192 and state parties formally "undertake to co-operate with
[UNHCR] ... in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facili-
tate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of [the Refu-
gee] Convention." 193 This unique trust and authority placed in UNHCR
has rightly been understood to call for decision-makers to give a measure
of deference to its interpretations. 1 94
Encouraged by UNHCR to see Articles l(F)(b) and 33(2) as largely
interchangeable means to protect the well being of their communities, 195
courts have often approved governmental efforts to invoke Article I(F) in
avoiding Article 33(2)'s higher standard of proof and more demanding sub-
stantive threshold. For example, the United States has traditionally
imported considerations into analysis of Article 1(F)(b) that are not rele-
vant in extradition proceedings. 196 In McMullen v. INS, the Ninth Circuit
continuing exclusion may be justified by continuing criminal character, in a manner
reminiscent of article 33(2)." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 10, at 102-04. Yet rather than
taking a clear position on the purpose of Article l(F)(b), he presents several options to
define a "more principled approach." Id. One of his four possible rationales for Article
1(F)(b) is concern for asylum-state safety, since the commission of a serious crime may
be "indicative of some future danger to the community of the State of refuge .... " Id.
Goodwin-Gill's reluctance to see Article 1(F)(b) as the means for excluding from refugee
status fugitives from justice likely follows from his view that it is unclear "whether the
drafters intended the exclusion clause to have more than an incidental role in the extra-
dition process." Id. His references to the travaux, however, only show that the drafters
had different views of precisely how refugee law and extradition law would be correlated
through Article 1(F)(b), not whether the alignment should exist.
190. Grahl-Madsen's analysis, which preceded the UNHCR Handbook, notes that Arti-
cle l(F)(b) derives from the exclusion of "ordinary criminals extraditable by treaty"
under the IRO mandate and the commitment of Article 14(2) of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights to deny asylum to persons in flight from "prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes." GRmL-MAnsEN, supra note 36, at 290. He concludes
succinctly that "the drafters of the cited instruments have desired that the instruments
they drew up should not be abused by fugitives from justice nor interfere with the law of
extradition." Id. (citation omitted). "In Article 33(2) emphasis is laid on the danger
which the person concerned represents to the community and not on the formal classifi-
cation of his offence." Id. at 292. Frd&ric Tiberghien endorses a comparable position.
FIDeiuc TIBERGHIEN, LA PROTECTION DES RIFUGIFS EN FRA'CE 103 (2d ed. 1988).
191. Infra text accompanying notes 210-30.
192. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, Annex 11 8(a), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
193. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 35(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
194. Indeed, even while taking a position at odds with that articulated in the Hand-
book, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged it as "a useful interpretative aid."
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999). Notably, that decision made no refer-
ence to the work of leading international scholars in refugee law and only briefly
alluded to the jurisprudence of another state party to the Refugee Convention.
195. UNHCR appears to endorse a unified understanding of these provisions. See
supra note 187.
196. The U.S. Supreme Court Aguirre-Aguirre decision implicitly rejected this
approach in 1999. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415; see supra text accompanying notes 74-
79.
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Court of Appeals ruled that extradition law was no more than a source of
guidance, insisting for example that exclusion under Article I(F)(b) is war-
ranted only if the acts committed amount to an "atrocity."197 Courts in
Australia and New Zealand, while recognizing the relevance of extradition
law, have similarly opined that the two concepts "are not necessarily analo-
gous."198 The Canadian Federal Court in Gil v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration articulated the most extreme position, explicitly rejecting
the relevance of the scope of extraditable criminality to exclude under Arti-
cle l(F)(b) a militant Iranian student opposed to the Khomeini regime
because "[i]t is not in the public interest that this country should become a
safe haven for mass bombers."1 99
As already explained, the historical record does not justify UNHCR's
view that Article 1(F)(b) is, like Article 33(2), a means by which a govern-
ment may effectively protect its own security interests.200 But beyond this
doctrinal concern, the UNHCR position is both illogical and dangerous in
practice.
UNHCR explains the existence of two distinct provisions, both alleg-
edly intended to promote the same goal of asylum-state safety and security,
by distinguishing the circumstances where each applies. Specifically,
UNHCR takes the position that Article 33(2) is the means by which an
asylum state can divest itself of responsibility toward a refugee who has
engaged in criminal activities within the asylum country, while Article
1(F)(b) allows exclusion based only on criminal acts committed "outside
the country of refuge."201 This allocation of roles, however, is difficult to
reconcile with the substance of the two articles.
Specifically, Article 1(F)(b) authorizes exclusion where the asylum
seeker has committed a "serious" crime. In contrast, Article 33(2) allows
states to deny protection only where the refugee has committed a "particu-
larly serious" crime and has been found to be "a danger to the community"
of the asylum country.202 Under UNHCR's interpretation, a state has a
197. 788 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1986). In contrast to the majority's freestanding
approach to interpreting "non-political crime," Judge Goodwin's concurring opinion
soundly condemned the logic of a conceptual divorce between the political offense
exception codified in refugee law and extradition law. As he candidly observed, "Itihe
majority's attempt to distinguish deportation from extradition for the purpose of defin-
ing political offenses amounts to no more than a distinction without a difference." Id. at
600 (Goodwin, J., concurring).
198. Singh v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, No. BC9907644
(Austl. Fed. Ct. Nov. 19, 1999) (LEXIS, Australia Library, UNRPT File); see also S. v.
Refugee Status Appeals Authority [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 301, 311 (H.C.), aff'd, [1998] 2
N.Z.L.R. 291 (C.A.).
199. [1995] 1 F.C. 508, 535 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1994).
200. See supra Part IV.A.
201. UNHCR argues that "[riefugees who commit serious crimes within the country
of refuge are not subject to the exclusion clause. They are subject to that country's crimi-
nal law process and to Articles 32 and 33(2) of the 1951 Convention, in the case of
particularly serious crimes." UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 1 19.
202. The treatment afforded narcotics offenders exemplifies the enhanced risk to refu-
gees from resorting to Article 1(F)(b). States have routinely characterized narcotics
offenses as "serious." E.g., Dhayakpa v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs
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justifiable concern for its safety when faced with an asylum seeker who has
committed no more than a "serious" crime in another country. But armed
with evidence that a refugee committed the same crime in its own territory,
a state may have no right to withhold protection, according to UNCHR.
This inconsistency derives from UNHCR's insistence that a state may pro-
tect itself against risks to its own safety posed by an on-site criminal asy-
lum seeker only in accordance with Article 33(2)-only where the crime
committed is "particularly serious," not just serious, and the state finds
that the asylum seeker can fairly be characterized as a danger to the host
community. Thus, UNHCR's view of the respective roles for Articles
l(F)(b) and 33(2) requires accepting the astounding proposition that some
crimes committed outside the asylum country are probative of risk to the
asylum-state community, but the same crimes committed inside the asylum
country are no basis for concern about communal safety. This makes no
sense.
The historically grounded explanation for the roles of Article 1(F)(b)
and Article 33(2), on the other hand, does not present this logical diffi-
culty. Because the objective of Article l(F)(b) is to guard against infiltra-
tion of the asylum system by fugitives from justice and to ensure that
refugee law presents no impediment to obligations under extradition trea-
ties, it is logical to base exclusion decisions on the simple fact that an asy-
lum seeker committed an extraditable crime. In contrast, given Article
33(2)'s purpose of reconciling asylum-state security interests with the refu-
gees' protection interests, the Article calls for an inquiry predicated on
demonstrating risk to the host state or its community. The "balancing" of
interests that UNHCR erroneously attempts to import into Article
1(F)(b) 20 3 is textually present in Article 33(2)-only "particularly serious"
crimes can outweigh a presumptive need for shelter from persecution, and
the asylum state must demonstrate a real danger to its community from the
refugee's presence. In sum, by recognizing that the purpose of Article
I(F)(b) is to exclude fugitives from justice and promote international com-
ity in enforcing criminal law, with only Article 33(2) directed to vindicat-
ing domestic safety and security, a division of roles that corresponds with
both history and logic is identified.
Beyond its illogicality, UNHCR's failure to embrace the historically
grounded view of Article l(F)(b) as excluding only fugitives from justice
from refugee status has lent credibility to the peremptory denial of refugee
status to an unjustifiably broad class of persons. The UNHCR view that
Article l(F)(b) safeguards asylum-state safety and security has encouraged
(1995) 62 F.C.R. 556, 560 (Austl. Fed. Ct.); Rajkumar, French Commission des recours
des rdfugids, Decision No. 230875 (Mar. 12, 1993). But the circumstances of the
offense may exclude them from the ambit of "particularly serious" crimes. See, e.g.,
Bahadori v. INS, 947 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision); Beltran-
Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990). Article 33(2)'s insistence on the need to
prove both a final conviction and risk to the asylum community before withdrawing
protection further narrows the risk of a denial of protection. Netherlands/F.V., HR, 13
mei 1988, NJ 910, ' 3.2.1, 20 NErm. Y.B. Ir'L L. 329, 331.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 253-70.
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some governments to exclude summarily persons whose actions do not fall
within even the prima facie range of extraditable criminality. States have
thus relied on Article l(F)(b) to exclude asylum seekers whose crimes have
been committed in the asylum country and whose criminality is no longer
justiciable. Also, UNHCR's severing of the intended linkage between Arti-
cle 1(F)(b) and extradition law has prompted states to articulate refugee-
specific and sometimes punitive redefinitions of a "nonpolitical crime."
Governments have too often felt free to adopt a double standard under
which refugee status is summarily denied in circumstances that would
have immunized an individual from extradition. Had states appreciated
the historical rationale for Article 1(F)(b), those refugees would have bene-
fited from the more abundant protections codified in Article 33(2).
A. Unwarranted Expansion of the Class of Persons Subject to
Peremptory Exclusion
The UNHCR view of Article 1(F)(b) as a mechanism for protecting asylum-
state interests has sometimes been invoked to exclude persons whose crim-
inal conduct has not, in fact, taken place outside the country of refuge. For
example, the Australian Federal Court in Dhayakpa v. Minister for Immigra-
tion and Ethnic Affairs considered the case of an applicant determined to be
a Chinese citizen by virtue of his birth in Tibet.20 4 The court accepted his
genuine risk of persecution based on the political opinion imputed to him
as a consequence of his service in the Indian Special Frontier Force.20 5
Prior to his application for refugee status, however, he was charged and
convicted of conspiracy to import heroin into Australia.20 6 The Refugee
Review Tribunal excluded him from refugee status under Article 1(F)(b) on
the grounds that he had committed a serious nonpolitical crime "outside
the country of refuge."20 7 The Federal Court affirmed this finding:
A person who would otherwise qualify for admission as a refugee may be
disqualified by the operation of Art 1F(b) if it were shown that such a per-
son had a record of serious non-political criminal offences whether in the
country of origin or elsewhere. In my opinion also it makes no difference
that the offence, in this case a continuing offence, was committed both
outside and within Australia.208
This finding is untenable if Article l(F)(b) is understood as a means of
avoiding the admission of persons who would otherwise evade criminal
responsibility for their actions, or more specifically who would compro-
mise the implementation of extradition treaties. Yet the court circum-
vented the express language of Article 1(F)(b), referring only to crimes
committed "outside" the country of refuge, because of its view that the fun-
damental purpose of Article 1(F)(b) is to protect the host country's secur-
204. Dhayakpa, 62 F.C.R. at 559-60.
205. Id. at 561.
206. Id. at 560-61.
207. Id. at 564-65.
208. Id. at 565.
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ity interests. 20 9 Basing its finding on the UNHCR Handbook, the court
concluded: "The exemption in Art 1F(b) ... is protective of the order and
safety of the receiving State. It is not.., to be construed so narrowly as to
undercut its evident policy."210
In contrast, German courts have not challenged the historical under-
standing of Article l(F)(b) as directed to the exclusion of fugitives from
justice. Thus, the Bavarian Higher Administrative Court-also confronted
with a criminality exclusion request for an asylum seeker guilty of a contin-
uing offense-did not take the Australian approach. 211 The German court
held that because a continuing offense is committed partly in the asylum
country and can be prosecuted in that state, Article l(F)(b) is
inapplicable.212
An even more shocking distortion of Article l(F)(b) is endorsed by
French tribunals. In Azam Ghulam,213 the tribunal suggested that a Pakis-
tani refugee claimant convicted in France of voluntary homicide could
properly be excluded from refugee status under Article l(F)(b).214 The
Commission des recours opined that although Article 1(F)(b) speaks to
crimes committed outside the asylum country, it is also sometimes a basis
for exclusion based on crimes committed inside the asylum country. 215
The subsequent Rajkumar decision elucidated the logic behind this
counterintuitive holding.216 That case involved a refugee claimant con-
victed in France of a narcotics offense, and who was sentenced to six years
of imprisonment followed by expulsion from France.217 Incredibly, the
Commission des recours held that it was entitled to apply Article l(F)(b) to a
crime committed on French territory because "persons on French soil who
have yet to be granted refugee status" 218 remain "outside" of France!219
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Decision No. 72 XII 77 (June 7, 1979)
(Oberverwaltungsgericht). The case involved a Czech citizen who hijacked a Czech
civilian aircraft to make his escape to asylum. The court observed that the crime was
not committed wholly outside the country of refuge, but rather continued and ended in
Germany. Id. Because a German court therefore had jurisdiction over the offence, an
extradition-based understanding of Article l(F)(b) prohibits exclusion. Instead, the
individual should be tried and punished as appropriate under domestic law, with
removal pursuant to Article 33(2) where appropriate. Developments in international
law since this case may also require the exclusion of aircraft hijackers from refugee sta-
tus, pursuant to Article l(F)(c). See supra text accompanying note 65.
212. Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Decision No. 72 XII 77 (June 7, 1979)
(Oberverwaltungsgericht).
213. French Commission des recours des r~fugi~s, Decision No. 62749 (Sept. 15,
1988).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. French Commission des recours des rdfugi~s Decision No. 230875 (Mar. 12,
1993).
217. Id.
218. Where refugee status has been recognized, however, the Conseil d'Etat recog-
nizes that the state may be wvithdraw status only under Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention, not Article l(F)(b). Moses Allueke, French Conseil d'Etat, Decision No.
188981 (Nov. 3, 1999).
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Our point is not that UNHCR approved of either the Australian or
French misinterpretations of Article l(F)(b). To the contrary, UNHCR has
insisted that "Article 1F(b) requires that the crime in question was commit-
ted 'outside the country of refuge... prior to his admission' to the country
of asylum. This could be the country of origin, or another country. It can
never be the country where the applicant seeks recognition as a refu-
gee."2 20 But it should come as no surprise that governments invited to
view Article l(F)(b) as a means to protect their security interests, rather
than to exclude fugitives from justice, are tempted to engage in semantic
machinations that expand the scope of the Article 1(F)(b) exclusion in
ways that are fundamentally at odds with both the Convention's text and
the drafters' intentions.
Beyond expanding the class of persons subject to peremptory exclu-
sion to include claimants whose criminality has not taken place wholly
outside the asylum state, UNHCR's interpretation of the purpose of Article
1(F)(b) 22 1 has also supported the exclusion under Article 1(F)(b) of per-
sons whose past criminality is no longer justiciable. UNHCR's position on
justiciability as a requirement for Article l(F)(b) exclusion has tradition-
ally been vague. 2 22 Its more recent assertions, however, actually give com-
fort to those who would invoke this exclusion clause against persons who
are in no sense fugitives from justice.2 23
While states such as Canada2 24 and Switzerland 225 have traditionally
declared that criminals who satisfy the penalty imposed upon them should
not be excluded under Article l(F)(b), this principled position is increas-
ingly fragile. 22 6 Indeed, in the Australian Dhayakpa decision, the court
219. It is unlikely that this reasoning can be reconciled with the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights that held that asylum seekers in an "international
zone" at Paris's Orly Airport were entitled to real and effective rights. Amuur v. France,
1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 850.
220. UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, el 19 (alteration in original).
221. Supra note 187 and accompanying text.
222. The fact that an applicant convicted of a serious non-political crime has
already served his sentence or has been granted a pardon or has benefited from
an amnesty is also relevant. In the latter case, there is a presumption that the
exclusion clause is no longer applicable, unless it can be shown that, despite the
pardon or amnesty, the applicant's criminal character still predominates.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 157, at 37.
223. "While Article 1F(b) offers no guidance on the role of expiation, practice has
been to interpret it as applying chiefly to fugitives from justice, and not to those who
have already served their sentences, unless they are regarded as continuing to constitute
a menace to a new community." UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 1 19.
224. Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 743 (Can. 1992)
("Ward would still not be excluded [under Article 1(F)(b)], having already been con-
victed of his crimes and having already served his sentence.").
225. Office federal des refugi~s, Manuel de procedures d'asile 144 (1996) ("On ne doit
pas exclure a priori de la protection contre les persecutions garantie par le droit d'asile
toute personne ayant encouru dans le passd une sanction penale.").
226. One commentator noted the tacit-and in our view legally problematic-attempt
of the Canadian Federal Court Trial Division in Shamlou v. Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, (1995) 103 FTR 241, to dissent from the Canadian Supreme Court's posi-
tion enunciated in Ward. Joseph Rikhof, Exclusion Clauses: The First Hundred Cases in
the Federal Court, 34 IMMIGR. L. REP. (2d) 137 (1996).
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had no difficulty ordering exclusion under Article 1(F)(b) even though
Dhayakpa had completed his prison sentence in Australia by the time he
applied for refugee status.227 The court flatly rejected Professor Grahl-
Madsen's insistence on justiciability as an essential element of criminality
for Article l(F)(b):
Grahl-Madsen suggests that the Art 1F(b) exemption does not extend to
crimes for which punishment has been suffered or crimes which are either
too unimportant to warrant extradition or are no longer justiciable. The dif-
ficulty with that construction, so far as it refers as to prior punishment or
justiciability, is that it imports into Art 1F(b) limitations not able to be
found in the language of the Article. 228
The court failed to address the fact that Article 1(F)(b) is limited to crimes
committed "outside the country of refuge" and textually constrained by the
political offense exception-indicators of an extradition-based rationale for
the article. Also, the Australian Federal Court did not consult the travaux
preparatoires to distill the contextualized purpose of Article 1(F)(b) or com-
pare the article's history with that of Article 33(2).229 It simply insisted
that
The operation of the [Article l(F)(b)] exemption is not punitive. There can
be no question of twice punishing a person for the same offence. Rather it is
protective of the interests of the receiving State. The protective function is not
limited according to whether or not the punishment has been
inflicted .... 230
Indeed, it is difficult to contest the court's approach if UNHCR's erroneous
interpretation of Article 1(F)(b) is embraced. Yet if understood as a mecha-
nism to exclude fugitives from justice, the Australian reasoning is patently
wrong.
In sum, the view that Article l(F)(b) promotes asylum-state security
interests means in practice that persons who are in no sense fugitives from
justice abroad are subject to exclusion. Both expansions of the exclusion
class identified here-persons whose criminal conduct did not occur
outside the asylum state and those whose criminality is no longer justicia-
ble-may not be excluded under the historically grounded understanding
of Article l(F)(b). Nonetheless, to the extent that Article 1(F)(b) has erro-
neously come to be understood simply as a means to protect the interests
227. Dhayakpa v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 F.C.R. 556,
565 (Austl. Fed. Ct.).
228. Id. at 564.
229. In the Australian Federal Court's more recent decision of Ovcharuk v. Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 158 A.L.R. 289 (Austl. Fed. Ct.), Judge
Sackville canvassed the drafting history of the Refugee Convention, id. at 302-04, but
found no clear evidence that the drafters intended Article 1(F)(b) to exclude persons on
grounds of extraditable criminality. Id. at 301-06. While the justiciability issue was not
expressly addressed, the court upheld the Dhayakpa rule to exclude a Russian national
convicted in Australia and serving time in an Australian prison at the time of his applica-
tion for a protection visa. Id. at 289.
230. Dhayakpa, 62 F.C.R. at 565 (emphasis added).
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of receiving states, the expansion of the excluded class is entirely
explicable.
B. Redefining the Political Offense Exception
Beyond giving comfort to states that seek to widen the scope of relevant
prima facie criminality, UNHCR's failure to link Article l(F)(b) to extradi-
tion law also facilitated the evolution of a distinctly punitive understanding
of the political offense exception in refugee law. As elaborated above, Arti-
cle l(F)(b) requires states to interpret extraditable criminality not only by
the gravity of the offense but also their own understandings of the limits to
justifiable extradition. Article l(F)(b) incorporates the political offense
exception found in most extradition treaties, a proviso that authorizes a
state to withhold extradition where it considers the individual concerned
likely to face "political," rather than truly criminal, prosecution. 231
A different position, however, is taken by UNHCR. Rather than advo-
cating a symmetrical approach to the political offense exception in refugee
law and extradition law, UNHCR appears to encourage a more categorical
interpretation, albeit one that borrows selectively from various national
understandings of the political offense exception in extradition law:
The serious crime must also be non-political, which implies that other
motives, such as personal reasons or gain, predominate. Increasingly, extra-
dition treaties specify that certain crimes, notably acts of terrorism, are to be
regarded as non-political for the purpose of those treaties, although they typ-
ically also contain protective clauses in respect of refugees. For a crime to be
regarded as political, its political objective must also, for the purposes of this
analysis, be consistent with the exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Crimes which deliberately inflict extreme human suffering, or
which violate jus cogens rules of international law, cannot possibly be justi-
fied by any political objective. 232
A crime's characterization as political will therefore normally follow from
the motive for its commission, unless the act in question infringes human
rights or a jus cogens norm of international law or results in the infliction
of "extreme human suffering."
There is no consensus, however, that the political offense exception in
extradition law should be interpreted in line with UNHCR's understanding
of a political crime for purposes of Article l(F)(b).2 33 The unfortunate
implication of UNHCR's decision to posit this single objective test for inter-
preting the political offense provision of Article l(F)(b) is that govern-
ments should feel free-and, perhaps, even obliged-to interpret the
political offense proviso in refugee law differently than in their extradition
231. See supra text accompanying notes 123-39.
232. UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 1 17 (endnote omitted).
233. "The political offense exception to extradition is one of the more controversial
topics in extradition law today; paradoxically, it is one of the most universally accepted,
yet strongly contested rules of international law. Virtually all domestic extradition laws
and international treaties contain the exception." BLAKFSLEY, supra note 115, at 264-69.
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law.23 4 The ethical symmetry imposed by the historical understanding of
Article 1(F)(b) is lost,23 5 and states are invited to exclude refugees for rea-
sons beyond the reasonable limits on their usual authority to withhold
extradition.
The determination of some asylum states not to be bound in refugee
law by their definitions of the political offense exception is most forcefully
argued in the Canadian decision, Gil v. Minister of Employment and Immi-
gration.23 6 In defining its approach to interpreting the political offense
exception in Article 1(F)(b), the Federal Court observed that
the characterization of crimes as "political" is found in both extradition and
refugee law. This has led some commentators to suggest that they are but
two sides of the same coin and serve to complement one another: the fugi-
tive who cannot be extradited may seek asylum; the refugee claimant who is
excluded may be extradited. 23 7
In response, the court advanced nine arguments2 38 to demonstrate "a need
for even greater caution in characterizing a crime as political for the pur-
poses of applying Article 1F(b) than for the purpose of denying
extradition."23 9
The Canadian court's approach, however, is fundamentally flawed. 240
234. This lack of symmetry follows logically from UNHCR's understanding of Article
l(F)(b) as embodying a commitment to protect asylum-state interests. It makes little
sense to reconcile refugee law with extradition law by adopting divergent tests for justifi-
able prima facie criminality. It would be even less defensible to defer to a state's stan-
dards of unacceptable criminality while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge that
country's appreciation of the principled limits of criminal law authority.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
236. 11995] 1 F.C. 508, 535 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1994). The approach in Gil has been
endorsed by decision-makers in other countries. E.g. T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] AC. 742,
785 (1995) (Lloyd of Berwick, LJ.) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (noting that it
"derived the greatest help" from the decision in Gil); S. v. Refugee Status Appeals Author-
ity [19981 2 N.Z.L.R. 301, 315-17 (H.C.), affd, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 291 (C.A.).
237. Gil, [1995] 1 F.C. at 516 (footnote omitted).
238. Id. at 516-18.
239. Id. at 518.
240. The first argument posited in Gil is that deference in refugee law to the extradi-
tion-law interpretation of the political offense exception is unwarranted because extradi-
tion is a treaty obligation, whereas refugee status is a domestic legal obligation
established to comply with a treaty. Id. at 516. That states often implement the Refugee
Convention in domestic law does not, however, detract from the treaty-based duty not to
exclude from protection a refugee who has committed a "political crime." If the Federal
Court uses a narrower understanding of political offense as a strategy to avoid the pros-
pect of refugees insisting on the benefits of international obligations an asylum country
has freely chosen to adopt and codify in domestic law, then the court illegitimately
undercut rights granted by executive and legislative action.
A second unfounded argument advanced against a symmetrical approach to defining
the political offense exception is that extradition proceedings generally involve a contes-
tation of "guilt," whereas refugees often admit "crimes" claimed to be political. Id. at
516-17. This distinction is artificial and semantic. In both extradition and refugee con-
texts, the individual concerned asserts that he or she is not "guilty" in any meaningful
sense because the relevant acts either have not been committed or have been committed
in a context that should not impose criminal liability. In either case, the individual
makes essentially the same assertion-that exposure to the other state's legal apparatus
carries the risk of wrongful criminal conviction.
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A third tack taken by the Canadian court suggested an ulterior motive to assertions of
political offense in refugee claims, since a political offense finding makes refugee status
"almost a foregone conclusion." Id. at 517. In the extradition context, on the other
hand, "it is generally assumed that the requesting state will afford to the fugitive all the
usual legal protections and no ulterior motive is presumed..." Id. It is not, however, the
requesting state's potential ulterior motive that is the relevant point of comparison-the
requesting state would not characterize a matter as a political offense. The relevant com-
parison for ulterior motives is the individual who resists extradition-where like a refu-
gee, his or her assertion of the political offense exception may be motivated by no more
than a desire to avoid removal. In both cases, though, the "risk" is simply that an indi-
vidual improperly raises the defense, not that he or she prevents removal for improper
reasons. The relevant decision-maker makes that decision in each case.
A fourth argument adopted by the court is that political offense in Canadian extradi-
tion law broadly includes both political crimes and politically motivated prosecutions.
Id. In contrast, the court suggests that the Refugee Convention recognizes only "politi-
cal crimes" as a basis for withholding removal. Id. The fact that Canada lists "political
crimes" and "politically motivated prosecutions" separately in its extradition laws can-
not, however, be taken as dispositive of the substantive scope of the international legal
definition of a "political crime." In fact, modern multilateral extradition treaties tend to
allow states to withhold extradition on the grounds of politically selective prosecution.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
A fifth basis for divorcing the political offense exception in refugee law from its extra-
dition-law counterpart is the inappropriateness of requiring a state to grant "asylum" to
an individual "only" exposed to the risk of prosecution for a relative political offense. Id.
at 517-18. The asserted duty "to welcome [a political assassin] with open arms," id., is
both inflammatory and inaccurate. Each state remains free to determine whether the
predominantly political character of an act renders something political that would other-
wise be a common crime. But if the state so determines, it is difficult to see why states
would object to protecting an individual at risk of prosecution for a defensible action. It
is also hard to understand why a state would feel less comfortable admitting a person
"only" exposed to criminal prosecution for an act that is not in essence criminal, con-
trasted with the duty to protect persons charged with offenses that are not appropriately
within the ambit of the criminal law. In both cases, the goal is preventing the removal of
persons to face an abuse of power through the criminal law of the destination state. In
any event, the Canadian Federal Court's position does not account for Refugee Conven-
tion Articles l(F)(a) and (c) or 33(2), all of which safeguard a state from being required
to admit dangerous persons.
The sixth argument raised in Gil is that the political offense exception in refugee law
should not be construed on the basis of extradition-derived interpretations because Arti-
cle 1(F)(b) is limited to serious crimes, whereas the extradition concept has no such
qualifications. Id. at 518. But states do not grant extradition in every matter a request-
ing state might conceivably deem criminal; they grant extradition only where the alleged
crime is within a list of serious offenses. The shorthand "serious crimes" codified in the
Refugee Convention simply acknowledges that states do not agree on a single list of
offenses that warrant extradition. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20. There is
no dispute, however, regarding the shared goal of reserving extradition for "serious
crimes."
The Gil court also attempted to justify a freestanding interpretation of the political
offense exception in refugee law on the grounds that extradition law concerned the pros-
ecution of matters generally agreed to be criminal, while refugee law "is concerned with
the admission to Canada of permanent residents who may ultimately become citizens."
Id. This argument is not true under international law. Refugee law does not impose a
duty to grant permanent admission, much less citizenship. Some countries, including
Canada, have chosen to make this equation for reasons of domestic policy and politics.
That decision cannot, however, logically be asserted as a basis for denying refugees the
legally mandated right to receive protection for the duration of the risk in their country
of origin. This issue parallels the central question in an extradition hearing where the
individual invokes the political offense exception, namely whether the nature'or circum-
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The asserted linkage between the political offense exception in refugee law
and extradition law is not based simply on common terminology, but on
the historical record of the drafting process. The drafters established Arti-
cle 1(F)(b) precisely to align refugee law with extradition law; conse-
quently, it is not surprising they incorporated the same political offense
concept.2 41 More fundamentally, while an excluded refugee claimant may
be extradited, it does not follow that any nonextraditable person may seek
"asylum," at least if that term implies an automatic right to claim the bene-
fits of refugee status. Either the court used the term "asylum" carelessly-
to imply some general sociopolitical discretionary right to remain-or it
failed to recognize the consequence for a refugee claimant if a court holds
that an alleged offense in the country of origin is a political offense. In
particular, Article 1(F)(a) and (c), as well as Article 33(2), may still be
invoked to deny protection, even to a person at genuine risk for a relevant
reason. These provisions therefore answer the court's in terrorem argument
that "[ilt is not in the public interest that this country should become a safe
haven for mass bombers."242
Recently overruled U.S. precedent, McMullen v. INS,2 43 illustrates the
risk to refugees where Article 1(F)(b) analysis is not grounded in the usual
stances of the alleged offense are such that returning the individual would pose an unac-
ceptable risk.
Finally, two arguments advanced in Gil make clear the importance of a developed
appreciation for the historically grounded purposes of Article l(F)(b). First, the court
argued that in a refugee case, unlike an extradition case, the state of origin rarely
expresses any interest in the claimant's return. Id. at 516. Second and related, the court
rightly observed that whereas a decision to extradite necessarily involves the individ-
ual's return to face trial, the exclusion of a refugee may not lead to his or her return to
the country where the crime was committed. Id. at 518. The common concern
expressed in these arguments is that reconciling the understanding of political offense
in refugee law with the meaning assigned in extradition law may not make sense
because the same consequences do not follow in each case. In other words, Article
1(F)(b) exclusion may follow even where there is no indication that prosecution in the
state of origin will ensue. If so, why should the extradition-derived test necessarily
govern?
If the drafters intended Article 1(F)(b) only to reconcile refugee law with extradition
law in the fairly narrow sense of enabling asylum countries to avoid conflicting obliga-
tions, the Federal Court's objections would be warranted. But because Article 1(F)(b)
has a second and more general goal-namely, to exclude from refugee status all fugitives
from justice as unworthy of international protection, regardless of whether they are
actively pursued for extradition purposes-the two objections cannot stand. Under-
stood as identifying those asylum seekers who are not, in substance, fugitives from jus-
tice, the logic of defining the political offense proviso in Article l(F)(b) according to the
asylum state's political offense exception for extradition is dear.
241. See supra Part IV.A. Interestingly, the correlation between refugee law and extra-
dition law seems to work in both directions. John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyn-
gaert recently wrote that Article 11 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition,
Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, 282, which excludes extradition where the
requested state believes a persecutory intent underlies the request, was "modelled on the
non-refoulement provision in the 1951 Convention [rielating to the Status of Refugees."
John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,
92 AMt. J. I'r'L L. 187, 192-93 (1998).
242. Gil, [1995] 1 F.C. at 535.
243. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
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rules of extradition law. Under the traditional U.S. definition of the politi-
cal offense exception, if the case involves an insurgent seeking to change
his or her government through a process that enjoys a broad base of popu-
lar support, U.S. courts will remain ideologically neutral and refrain from
assessing the appropriateness of particular means to achieve political self-
determination. 2 44 Yet confronted in McMullen with an asylum claim from
a member of the Provisional Irish Republication Army (PIRA) who had par-
ticipated in the bombing of military barracks before formally resigning in
protest of the PIRA's increasingly extremist tactics, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to reverse a decision ordering his
exclusion from refugee status on the grounds of criminality. 245 The court
candidly asserted the importance of not placing "too much weight on the
definition of political offences in extradition cases," insisting instead on a
"balancing approach including consideration of the offense's 'proportional-
ity' to its objective and its degree of atrocity.. .,"246 a notion traditionally
rejected by U.S. courts in the extradition context.
Because of its mistaken view that the criminal exclusion clause in refu-
gee law promotes asylum-state security,24 7 the court felt no qualms about
the asymmetry of refusing to protect as a refugee the kind of person nor-
mally protected in an extradition context. The McMullen court ignored its
own case law on the political offense exception in extradition law and
adopted for refugee law purposes the Seventh Circuit's more restrictive
approach,2 48 as stated in Eain v. Wilkes:
[Niothing would prevent an influx of terrorists seeking a safe haven in
America. Those terrorists who flee to this country would avoid having to
answer to anyone anywhere for their crimes .... We do not need them in
our society .... [T]he political offense exception.., should be applied with
great care lest our country become a social jungle and an encouragement to
terrorists everywhere. 249
This reasoning is patently false. By simply acknowledging that it no longer
claims the right to deny the extradition of persons charged with terrorist
acts, the United States could easily exclude from refugee status under Arti-
244. See GILBERT, supra note 112, at 229.
Until 1986, no member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) had ever
been returned following a request from the United Kingdom government. The
courts held that there was a political disturbance in Northern Ireland and any
crime committed for the objectives of the IRA was a political offence and, thus,
non-extraditable.
Id.
245. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 592-95.
246. Id. at 596.
247. The McMullen court asserted that the purpose of criminal exclusion in refugee
proceedings is to identify persons guilty of "an act which Congress has determined
makes the individual an 'undesirable' in the eyes of the law." Id.
248. Id. at 597-98.
249. 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
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cle 1(F)(b) persons who commit those crimes.2 50 Even if it wished to
retain the political discretion to withhold the extradition of terrorists in
some circumstances, the United States could still protect its security inter-
ests by meeting the standards in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.
These cases demonstrate that the UNHCR position rationalizes a free-
standing approach to interpreting Article 1(F)(b) that can lead to exclusion
based on often visceral and highly subjective characterizations of conduct
as "terrorism" or an "atrocity. " 25 1 As Lord Mustill remarked,
Whilst I respect this impulse, it is hard to accept as a reliable basis on which
to apply the exception, for it posits that the community of nations has found
it so clear that conduct which is political in the ordinary sense of the word
may be deprived of that character by its atrocious nature .... [In reality]
there is a tacit qualification, the boundaries of which depend entirely on the
personal reaction of the official or judge in the receiving state as to whether
the act is "atrocious" enough to merit special treatment.25 2
C. The Fallacy of the "Balancing Test"
State reliance on UNHCR's approach to Article 1(F)(b) has generated two
kinds of risk for refugees. First, the view of Article 1(F)(b) as safeguarding
state security interests has permitted governments to expand the class of
persons subject to peremptory criminal exclusion to include, for example,
persons whose criminal acts took place partly or wholly inside the asylum
state and those whose criminal conduct is no longer justiciable. Second,
by severing the intended linkage between Article 1(F)(b) and extradition
law, the UNHCR approach prompted a redefinition of the political offense
exception that resulted in the inequitable withholding of refugee status
from persons who would be exempt from removal under the asylum state's
understanding of the limits on legitimate criminal law authority.
This critique, however, neglects the integral quid pro quo in UNHCR's
understanding of Article 1(F)(b). UNHCR tempers its view that the crimi-
nal exclusion clause may be invoked to protect state safety and security
interests by insisting that states may not invoke Article 1(F)(b) if it would
"result in greater harm to the offender than is warranted by the alleged
crime."2 53 According to the Handbook:"
If a person has well-founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution
endangering his life or freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to
exclude him. If the persecution feared is less serious, it will be necessary to
have regard to the nature of the crime or crimes presumed to have been
250. A revised extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom
was ratified on December 23, 1986, which facilitated the extradition of IRA members to
the United Kingdom. GILBERT, supra note 112, at 230.
251. McMullen endorsed exclusion on the basis of "atrocity." McMullen, 788 F.2d at
596-97; see also EU joint Position, supra note 17, § 13.2 ("Particularly cruel actions, even
if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-politi-
cal crimes. This applies both to the participants in the crime and to its instigators.").
252. T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. 742, 772 (1995) (Mustill, I.J.) (appeal taken from
Eng. C.A.).
253. UNHCR Exclusion Note, supra note 17, 1 18.
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committed in order to establish whether the applicant is not in reality a fugi-
tive from justice or whether his criminal character does not outweigh his
character as a bona fide refugee.25 4
There is no reason to doubt that the "balancing test" was inspired by a
sincere humanitarian impulse. Yet it is not a legally tenable position. By
implicitly suggesting that some forms of "less serious" criminality can be
relevant for Article 1(F)(b) purposes, 255 UNHCR effectively invites states
to impose exclusion for crimes that fail to meet the drafters' basic litmus
test of extraditable criminality. Also, state practice does not support the
notion of gradations in persecution suggested by the reference to "less seri-
ous" persecution. Since any form of persecution is usually understood to
involve a "basic attack on human rights,"25 6 UNHCR's suggestion that
only "severe persecution" implicates "life or liberty" is highly doubtful.
Moreover, no historical support exists for a general duty under refugee
law to balance the harm feared by the asylum seeker against the gravity of
the crime committed.25 7 To the contrary, the drafters of the Refugee Con-
vention were aware that asylum seekers who were fugitives from justice
might experience a risk to their life or liberty from criminal sanction in
their country of origin. The drafters believed the duty to apply extradition-
derived exemptions from return when considering Article 1(F)(b) exclu-
sion was a sufficient guarantee against the prospect of removing a refugee
254. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 1 156, at 37.
255. The implication of this proposed rule is that "less serious" crimes may justify
exclusion only if the risk is "less serious" persecution. Apart from the unwarranted
expansion of relevant crimes, this approach also suggests that some persecutory risks
are more worthy of concern than others-a proposition that only creates uncertainty
and confusion for the recognition of refugee status.
256. EU Joint Position, supra note 17, § 4; see also JAMES C. SIMEON, HUMAN RIGHTS
NExus WORKING PARTY, INT'L ASS'N OF REFEREE LAW JUDGES, RAPPORTEUR'S REPORT 2
(1998) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter IARLJ NExus REPORT].
The Report proposes that the same model or framework of analysis for the term
persecution be adopted in every jurisdiction. The model proposed is one that
would integrate the use of human rights standards in the delineation of the term
persecution .... In short, the activities that a refugee claimant alleges to be
persecutory are to be measured against the rights enunciated in international
human rights instruments in order to assess whether the activities complained
of are persecutory.
Id.
257. The superadded balancing test proposed by UNHCR must be distinguished from
the balancing inherent in the notion of a "serious non-political crime." As the Supreme
Court of Canada observed, "Article 1F(b) contains a balancing mechanism in so far as
the specific adjectives 'serious' and 'non-political' must be satisfied.. . ." Pushpanathan
v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 1034 (Can.). The objec-
tive of this form of balancing, however, is to assess whether the act in question has a
predominantly political character. For example, balancing is called for where the claim-
ant faces politically inspired prosecution or differential sentencing or punishment that
would render a prima facie routine prosecution a "relative political offense." See GRAHL-
MADSEN, supra note 36, at 298 (stating that the balancing required under Article 1(F)(b)
is an inquiry into whether the means or duration of punishment for a crime "seem far
out of proportion to what would be a just punishment for the crime committed, or, in
other words, whether the political reasons for the person's absence from his home coun-
try outweigh the criminal reasons").
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to face a process that was not, in pith and substance, a fair application of
ordinary criminal law. Also, the drafters did not expressly or impliedly
commit to compare the relative weight of an asylum seeker's criminal and
refugee character. To the contrary, Article 1(F)(b) categorically excludes
fugitives from justice, so long as the crimes committed meet the agreed
minimum standard of gravity.
Whatever the "right" view of balancing, courts today are increasingly
unwilling to endorse UNHCR's balancing test. The Canadian Federal
Court in Gil fired the initial salvo. The court rejected any duty to balance
the harm faced by an excluded refugee claimant against the gravity of the
criminal conduct: "[Tihe claimant to whom the exclusion clause applies is
ex hypothesi in danger of persecution; the crime which he has committed is
by definition "serious".... It is not in the public interest that this country
should become a safe haven for mass bombers."25 8
This approach shows the inherent difficulty of UNHCR's insistence
that the purpose of Article 1(F)(b) is to protect the security interests of
asylum countries, yet exclusion must not occur where important individu-
ated interests are concerned. The Gil decision makes clear that the severe
nature of the risk faced by the refugee in the country of origin does not
undercut the security concerns of the asylum country. With Article
l(F)(b) misconstrued as promoting asylum-state interests, it is understand-
able that states have begun to question the logic of UNHCR's superadded
balancing test.
A year later, the Canadian Federal Court addressed the balancing test
issue again-this time with a more measured analysis. Malouf v. Canada
considered the claim of a Lebanese national convicted on narcotics and
theft charges before entering Canada to seek refugee status.25 9 He fled to
Canada prior to sentencing on those convictions. 2 60 The Immigration and
Refugee Board did not inquire into the merits of his refugee status claim,
but simply excluded him on the basis of Article l(F)(b). 26 1 The Federal
Court Trial Division certified a question to the Court of Appeal: "[I]s [the
decision-maker] required to consider the well-foundedness of the Conven-
tion refugee claimant's claim and then, if it is determined to be well-
founded, to balance the seriousness of the non-political crime considered
to have been committed by the claimant against the persecution feared by
the claimant?" 26 2 The appellate court answered the question in a clear and
legally correct manner:
Paragraph (b) of Article IF of the Convention should receive no different
treatment than paragraphs (a) and (c) thereof; none of them requires the
[decision-maker] to balance the seriousness of the Applicant's conduct
against the alleged fear of persecution .... [A] proportionality test [is] only
258. Gil v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1995] 1 F.C. 508, 534-35 (Can.
Fed. Ct. 1994).
259. [1995] 190 N.R. 230 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
260. Malouf v. Canada, [1995] 1 F.C. 537, 541-42 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
261. Id. at 544-45.
262. Maloufv. Canada, [1995] 190 N.Rt 230, 231 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
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appropriate for the purposes of determining whether or not a serious crime
should be viewed as political.2 63
Resort to balancing has also been rejected by the Australian Federal
Court,2 64 the British House of Lords, 265 the High Court of New Zea-
land,26 6 and most recently the U.S. Supreme Court. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the
U.S. Supreme Court considered the Ninth Circuit's insistence that exclu-
sion under Article 1(F)(b) is predicated on finding that the gravity of the
asylum seeker's criminal acts outweighed the gravity of persecution feared
from return.2 67 In other words, the Court of Appeals applied a UNHCR-
style additional "balancing test." The Supreme Court firmly rejected this
interpretation:
The Court of Appeals' error is clearest with respect to its holding that the
[Board of Immigration Appeals] was required to balance respondent's crimi-
nal acts against the risk of persecution he would face if returned to Guate-
mala .... As a matter of plain language, it is not obvious that an already-
completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering the fur-
ther circumstance that the alien may be subject to persecution if returned to
his home country....
... By its terms, the statute.., requires independent consideration of
the risk of persecution facing the alien before granting withholding. It is
reasonable to decide, as the BIA has done, that this factor can be considered
on its own and not also as a factor in determining whether the crime itself is
a serious, nonpolitical crime.2 68
263. Id.
264. Dhayakpa v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 F.C.R. 556,
563 (Austl. Fed. Ct.).
The adjective "serious" in Art 1F(b) involves an evaluative judgment about the
nature of the allegedly disqualifying crime. A broad concept of discretion may
encompass such evaluative judgment. But once the non-political crime commit-
ted outside the country of refuge is properly characterized as "serious," the pro-
visions of the Convention do not apply. There is no obligation under the
Convention on the receiving State to weigh up the degree of seriousness of a
serious crime against the possible harm to the applicant if returned to the state
of origin.
Id.
265. T. v. Home Sec'y, [1996] A.C. 742, 769 (1995) (Mustill, LJ.) (appeal taken from
Eng. C.A.) ("The gravity of the offence is relevant to the question whether it is 'serious'
for the purposes of article 1F(b). But the crime either is or is not political when commit-
ted, and its character cannot depend on the consequences which the offender may after-
wards suffer if he is returned.").
266. S. v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority found that Article 1(F)(b) does not exclude
only criminals who face "minimal persecution," but simply serious criminals. [1998] 2
N.Z.L.R. 301 (H.C.), affd, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 291 (C.A.). Once the crime in question
satisfies Article 1(F)(b), there is no basis for an implied duty to balance the gravity of the
harm feared against the seriousness of the crime committed. Id. This decision approves
of the Canadian decisions in Gil and Malouf arriving at the same conclusion that "a firm
line has been taken that the balancing exercise argued for by the plaintiff is not
required." Id. at 317. The court based this conclusion in part on the notion that the
similarities between extradition law and refugee law "cannot be pushed too far." Id.
The court also suggested that reliance on the "plain words" will allow for a more uniform
interpretation of Article l(F)(b) across states. Id. at 318.
267. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
268. Id. at 425-26.
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In view of this clear, and logically compelling, judicial trend, it seems
unlikely that UNHCR's insistence on a superadded balancing requirement
will survive in state practice. The net result of UNHCR's reformulation of
Article l(F)(b) is therefore decidedly negative for refugees. Not only has
the agency's ahistorical interpretation legitimated official efforts to expand
the class of persons subject to peremptory criminal exclusion, 269 but also
the one more generous approach to protection in the Handbook-the bal-
ancing requirement-is now largely discredited. 270
VII. Does Clarity About the Scope of Criminal Exclusion Really
Matter?
Our focus on defining a coherent understanding of the respective roles for
Articles 1(F) and 33(2) in claims advanced by asylum seekers who have
engaged in or supported violence abroad may be perceived by some as
unwise or unnecessary. At the level of principle, some may object to a
discussion of whether persons genuinely at risk of persecution should
nonetheless be returned to their home state because they do not "deserve"
refugee status. The concern is that the suggestion runs directly counter to
the contemporary position that at least some human rights are owed to
everyone, whatever their past actions.
Linked to this ethical concern is a practical objection, asserting the
peripheral relevance of refugee law. Since relevant norms of human rights
law are increasingly interpreted to prevent governments from expelling at-
risk persons,27 ' even on the grounds of criminality or avoiding a commu-
nal security threat, some may believe that accuracy in interpreting refugee
law is a matter of only modest concern because a remedy will always be
available under general norms of human rights law.272
269. See supra Parts VI.A-B.
270. In any event, the need for this quid pro quo has substantially diminished in
recent years as a result of the evolving interpretations of, for example, the European
Convention on Human Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Geneva Conventions. As described in more
detail below, the class of persons that UNHCR's balancing requirement would
embrace-those for whom "the persecution feared is so severe as to endanger the
offender's life or liberty"-can now avail themselves of additional legal protections that
do not depend on Convention refugee status (though these are not sources of
enfranchisement in the host state). See infra text accompanying notes 281-88.
271. E.g., General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., 27th Sess. c 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 19 (1986) [hereinafter
General Comment 15] ("[Tlhe general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant
must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.").
272. While the ebb and flow of the refugee definition will continue to be of criti-
cal importance and merit analysis accordingly, the asylum seeker and refugee
must also be positioned within a human rights framework which extends
beyond the [Refugee] Convention. In many circumstances this framework has
more to offer in terms of human rights protection.
Richard Plender & Nuala Mole, Beyond the Geneva Convention: Constructing a De Facto
Right of Asylum from International Human Rights Instruments, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND
Riu-nes: EVOLVING INTENAmIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES 81, 105 (Frances Nicholson
& Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
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There is no doubt that the broader duties of nonreturn developing
under international human rights law are of extraordinary benefit to those
who may not qualify for Convention refugee status. 273 As our analysis
makes dear, the Refugee Convention's peremptory exclusion rules and its
limitations on the duty of non-refoulement embrace the notion of "deserv-
ing" and "undeserving" persons. Those found undeserving, even though
at risk of serious harm, are not granted refugee status. 2 7 4 In contrast, rele-
vant human rights guarantees assume that personhood triggers protection,
whatever the individual's behavior. Human rights law focuses decision-
makers exclusively on the risk of sufficiently serious ill-treatment upon
return. Accusations of engaging in or promoting violent activity are imma-
terial to this substantive assessment of risk.
The strongest case for the effective irrelevance of refugee law can be
made for state parties to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention),
generally regarded as the most effective international human rights system
currently in operation.2 75 Unlike international refugee law, the European
Convention establishes a supervisory mechanism for individuals to seek
"international" enforcement of their rights. The European Court of Human
Rights has moreover taken a dynamic approach to interpreting Article 3 of
the European Convention, finding many rejected asylum seekers nonethe-
less entitled to remain in Europe by virtue of the duty of states not to sub-
ject anyone to "torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."2 76 Indeed, the court specifically determined in Chahal v.
United Kingdom that official concerns about asylum-state safety and secur-
ity cannot override the protection duty under the European Convention:
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic soci-
ety. The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in
273. See generally Oldrich Andrysek, Gaps in International Protection and the Potential
for Redress Through Individual Complaints Procedures, 9 Ir'L J. REFUGEE L. 392 (1997);
Alberta Fabbricotti, The Concept of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in International Law
and its Application in Asylum Cases, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 637 (1998); Brian Gorlick,
Refugee Protection and the Committee Against Torture, 7 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 504 (1995).
274. "[Rlefugee law is limited to asylum-seekers and refugees seeking protection with
'clean hands'." Hfline Lambert, Protection Against Refoulement in Europe: Human Rights
Law Comes to the Rescue, 48 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 515, 543 (1999).
275. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
276. E.g., Hilal v. United Kingdom, No. 45276/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 3, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.echr.coe.int; Jabari v. Turkey, No. 40035/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 11,
2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.int; Bahaddar v. Netherlands, 1998-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 250; D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-1I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777; H.L.R. v. France, 1997-IlI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 745; Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831; Ahmed v.
Austria, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2195; Amuur v. France, 1996-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 826; Cruz
Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991). See generally Ralf Alleweldt, Protection Against Expulsion
Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360(1993); Tetje Einarsen, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an
Implied Right to De Facto Asylum, 2 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 361 (1990); Christian Tomuschat,
A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. LJ. 257 (1992).
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modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. How-
ever, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespec-
tive of the victim's conduct ....
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally
absolute in expulsion cases.... In these circumstances, the activities of the
individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a mate-
rial consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than
that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention
on the Status of Refugees.
2 77
The absolute nature of the protection duty under the European Con-
vention thus contrasts markedly with international refugee law, lending
weight to the criticism that accuracy in interpreting refugee law is of margi-
nal practical importance.
On closer analysis, however, it would be a mistake to assume that all
persons entitled to Convention refugee status would also be protected by
the more powerful Article 3 of the European Convention. Although the
substantive scope of Article 3 is broader in some ways than the refugee
definition,2 78 it is also narrower. 2 79 The European Convention may only
be invoked by persons who face the risk of "torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment."280 Fear of "persecution" under the Refugee
Convention, on the other hand, embraces persons who reasonably antici-
pate a broader range of human rights violations.2 8 ' For example, an indi-
277. Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1855 (citation omitted). The British Home
Office rejected Chahal's asylum claim on the grounds that the breakdown of law and
order in the Punjab could not be regarded as persecution within the terms of the Refugee
Convention. Id. 1 35. Relying on Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Convention, the
government further determined that even if Chahal's claim was within the refugee defini-
tion, he would nonetheless be barred from refugee protection for reasons of national
security. Id. The European Court of Human Rights, however, found substantial
grounds to believe that Chahal faced a real risk of "torture or... inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention. Id. 11 72,
98-104. The court was persuaded by objective evidence of past and continuing human
rights violations by the Punjabi police and the inadequacy of efforts to reform or reor-
ganize the police. Id. 72, 98-104.
278. First, as the Chahal case makes dear, the European Convention does not deny
protection on grounds of criminality. Second, it does not condition entitlement to pro-
tection on a showing of nexus between the risk faced and one of the five grounds of civil
or political status.
279. Lambert, supra note 274, at 517 ("[T]he standard of evidential requirements is
set incredibly high and, as a result, can rarely be met in cases involving asylum-
seekers.").
280. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 275.
281. See, e.g., Sandralingham v. Home Sec'y, [19961 Imm. A.R. 97, 109 (Eng. C.A.)
(Simon Brown, LJ.); Gashi v. Home Sec'y, [1997] INLR 96, 111-12; see also IARLJ NExus
REPORT, supra note 256, at 4.
Professor Hathaway presents a framework of analysis based on the hierarchical
ordering of human rights as found in the UDHR, ICCPR and the ICESCR, i.e.,
the International Bill of Rights....
The [Human Rights Nexus Working Party] acknowledges that Professor
Hathaway's hierarchical approach is a widely accepted and easily applied stan-
dard for assessing what constitutes persecution through an application of the
IBR.
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vidual who fears arbitrary detention or severe economic sanctions for a
Convention reason would be unlikely to benefit from the duty of nonreturn
under Article 3 of the European Convention, but nonetheless qualifies for
Convention refugee status.
The value of the Refugee Convention becomes even more apparent
outside the European context. Remedies under the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (Torture Convention) 282 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Civil and Political Covenant) 283 are being
actively engaged by rejected asylum seekers in states that have adhered to
the relevant complaint mechanisms. For example, where an individual
meets the evidentiary standard in Article 3 of the Torture Convention,
return is absolutely prohibited. 284 Thus, the Committee Against Torture
required Sweden to protect a Shining Path guerrilla excluded from refugee
status.285 It held that "the test of article 3 of the Convention [against Tor-
ture] is absolute.... The nature of the activities in which the person con-
cerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a
determination under article 3 of the Convention. '286 Similarly, the
Human Rights Committee held that an individual may not be returned to
face the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Civil
and Political Covenant, whatever his or her personal circumstances. 287
IARLJ NExus REPORT, supra note 240, at 4.
282. Supra note 14.
283. Supra note 14.
284. U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 44, vol. II, Annex
V(A)(1), at 56, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (1997) (discussing Tala v. Sweden, Communication
No. 43/1996); U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 44, vol. II,
Annex V, at 62 (discussing X v. Netherlands, Communication No. 31/1995), 68 (discuss-
ing Alan v. Switzerland, Communication No. 21/1995), 81 (discussing Kisoki v Sweden,
Communication No. 41/1996).
Bearing in mind that the State party and the Committee are obliged to assess
whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in
danger of being subjected to torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or
extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere
theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being
highly probable.
U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 44, vol. II, Annex IX 1 6, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (1998).
285. U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 44, vol. II, Annex
V(B)(4) cl 14.5, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (1997) (discussing Tapia Paez v. Sweden, Com-
munication No. 39/1996).
286. Id.
287. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II, Annex XII(U),
at 138, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993) (discussing Kindler v. Canada, Communication No.
470/1991); U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II, Annex
IX(CC), at 189, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) (discussing Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communi-
cation No. 469/1991); U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 1I,
Annex X(M) 1116.1, at 116, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995) (discussing Cox v. Canada, Com-
munication No. 539/1993) ("[If a State party to the Covenant takes a decision relating
to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is
that that person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the
State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.").
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The substantive breadth of these U.N. human rights procedures, like Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention, is therefore in some ways broader than
the refugee definition by virtue both of the absence of a criminality exclu-
sion provision or the need to link risk to civil or political status.
Yet even more than Article 3 of the European Convention, the U.N.
human rights remedies akin to the duty of non-refoulement are available
only to a small subset of persons with a "fear of being persecuted"-those
who risk either torture or loss of life.288 Also, many countries have not
ratified these treaties, and even fewer have authorized the U.N. treaty bod-
ies to entertain individuated complaints from persons in their jurisdiction.
Finally, no U.N. human rights body can issue enforceable judgments. For
all of its importance as a de facto basis for appeal from negative refugee
status assessments, international human rights law does not yet establish a
duty of nonreturn for all persons entitled to Convention refugee status.28 9
Fundamentally, caution is warranted before advocating a position that
unwittingly contributes to a process of "de-formalization."290 As valuable
as the duties of nonreturn elaborated under the European Convention and
the United Nations human rights treaties are, persons who benefit solely
from the human rights law prohibitions belong to a general class of
"nonreturnable" persons whose status and entitlements may vary in prac-
tice considerably. Although nonreturnable persons may claim generic civil
and political rights,291 their access to important economic and social
rights is less clear. Those rights are not formally guaranteed at the regional
level, are subject to a duty of progressive implementation internationally,
and may legally be withheld altogether from noncitizens present in less
288. "INiot all human rights qualify as potential obstacles to extradition. Moreover,
there is no certainty about the content and scope of the rights that are most likely to
block extradition." Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 241, at 205.
289. There are various human rights violations that may be absolute obstacles to
extradition (such as torture), or that may in appropriate circumstances thwart
extradition (such as the denial of a fair trial). However, the inevitable conclu-
sion to be drawn from extradition practice is that, despite the link between
human rights and extradition, no general human rights exception exists.
Id. at 205-06.
290. Our concern is that states have artificially circumscribed the ambit of obliga-
tions under the Refugee Convention, thereby eroding its normative value. The term "de-
formalization" here describes a process that steadily undermines the concept of legality.
The intention is to classify the attack on international refugee law as part of a general
assault on international legality. If legality retains a critical edge, then it must, at least in
theory, act as a constraint on powerful actors in the international community. This
argument has similarities with the recent resurgence of interest in the democratic tradi-
tion in modern law. See, e.g., DAVID DYzENHAus, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL
SCHMITT, HANs KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); WILLIAM E. SCHEUER1AN,
BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1994). This concept challenges the idea, prevalent in some modern schools of legal
scholarship, that legality is either a "game" or a concept without determinate content.
291. See General Comment 15, supra note 271; see also European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 275, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224 ("The High Contracting Par-
ties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of this Convention."); Bouchelkia v. France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 686 (dealing
with Article 8 of the European Convention); Amuur v. France, 1996-II1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533
(dealing with Article 5 of the European Convention).
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developed countries.292 Refugees, in contrast, are automatically entitled to
claim social and economic rights, including rights to work, education,
social assistance, and public housing.293 Nor may the presence of refugees
simply be tolerated by the asylum state. Refugees have the right to recogni-
tion of their personal status and must be provided with identity papers and
travel documents. 294 In short, refugee status means much more than pro-
tection against refoulement; it is also social and political enfranchisement.
Because international refugee law is a status-granting mechanism, it is
important to resist its steady erosion. 295 Persons genuinely at risk of per-
secution require not only protection against return but also the means to
reestablish and support themselves in the asylum country. A generic
human rights treaty may afford protection from return to a person illegiti-
mately excluded from refugee status, but nonetheless leave that person in
legal and social limbo. Recognition as a refugee therefore makes a substan-
tive difference.
Conclusion
If international refugee law is to command the respect of those tasked with
its implementation, a defensible framework for offering and denying pro-
tection must be advanced. From its inception, international refugee law
has therefore accepted the need to reconcile each state's duty to protect
involuntary migrants with its responsibility to avoid the infiltration by
international criminals and fugitives from justice through refugee law.
Persons believed to have committed international crimes are deemed
inherently unworthy of international protection. This automatic exclusion
is partly purposive. The summary denial of refugee status to persons
believed to have committed international crimes clearly facilitates the
extradition of those persons to states prepared to prosecute crimes of uni-
versal jurisdiction, as well as to international criminal tribunals. But the
peremptory exclusion of international criminals is more fundamentally
symbolic. The stigma of having acted contrary to fundamental interna-
tional norms is so significant that the drafters of the Refugee Convention
determined that international criminals should never be allowed to benefit
292. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, art. 2(1), (3), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
293. Refugee Convention, supra note 4, arts. 17-19, 21-23, 189 U.N.T.S. at 164-68.
294. Id. arts. 12, 27-28, 189 U.N.T.S. at 162, 172.
295. Note on International Protection, U.N. Executive Comm. of the High Comm r's
Programme, 50th Sess. ' 10, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/914 (1999).
Overall, UNHCR detected a distinct trend in an increasing number of States to
move gradually away from a law or rights-based approach to refugee protection,
towards more discretionary and ad hoc arrangements that give greater primacy
to domestic concerns rather than to their international responsibilities. These
restrictive tendencies found their most recent manifestation in one country
where legislative proposals aimed at doing away with the distinction between
aliens and refugees, including dropping any requirement for specific determina-
tion of refugee status under the 1951 Convention.
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from refugee status. To hold otherwise would be to risk a loss of public
confidence in the logic of a duty to protect refugees arriving at their
borders.
The right of states to exclude peremptorily persons who have commit-
ted serious, nonpolitical crimes outside the country of refuge derives from
a comparable mix of practical and symbolic concerns. Exclusion under
Article l(F)(b) ensures that governments can honor their extradition trea-
ties without fear that fugitives from justice might demand shelter under
refugee law. But more generally, Article 1(F)(b) avoids the risk of degrada-
tion of refugee law that would likely follow from a duty to protect fugitives
from justice who have committed serious crimes.2 96 Because the asylum
country normally does not have jurisdiction to try or punish serious com-
mon crimes committed outside its territory, granting refugee status to a
fugitive from justice would have the socially invidious consequence of insu-
lating the asylum seeker from the consequences of his or her criminal
actions. Public confidence in the ethical value of refugee law would clearly
be challenged.
Peremptory exclusion of fugitives from justice is not an ideal solution.
To the contrary, it would be preferable to have a broader universal consen-
sus on which acts are appropriately defined as criminal, uniformly
enforced through an international mechanism-perhaps modeled on the
International Criminal Court.29 7 Asylum seekers believed to have commit-
ted a relevant offense could then be prosecuted and punished for their
crimes without any risk of direct or indirect refoulement to a place where
persecution is feared. But as the difficulties defining the substantive juris-
diction and independent enforcement authority of the International Crimi-
nal Court make clear, the current situation is still a long way from such a
comprehensive commitment to the internationalization of a broad range of
crime. Refugee law accepts and works within the present reality. It errs on
the side of excluding suspected serious criminals in the interest of keeping
the protection system itself alive.
Conceding the right of states to engage in peremptory exclusion under
Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention is not, however, tantamount to
acknowledging that any and all persons tainted by allegations of involve-
ment with violence may be denied refugee status. To the contrary, our
purpose here has been to show that an historically grounded and internally
consistent interpretation of the Refugee Convention leads to precisely the
opposite conclusion. Apart from those persons whose actions satisfy the
relatively strict definitions of international criminality, the Refugee Con-
296. Comparable symbolic concerns are less likely to follow from recognizing the
refugee status of minor criminals or those who had already expiated their criminal
actions-or who could be required to face criminal justice in the asylum state.
297. It is interesting to recall that the drafters authorized peremptory exclusion in
response to asylum seekers who were also fugitives from justice because of the absence
of an international tribunal able to prosecute their crimes. Supra text accompanying
note 96.
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vention restricts the right of states to engage in peremptory exclusion to
common criminals that the asylum country would agree to extradite.
Under this analytical framework, governments have two principled
options if concerned about protecting their communities from the risks
associated with asylum seekers who have engaged in or promoted violence
abroad. First and most obvious, a government can commit to an under-
standing of extraditable criminality-including a narrowed political
offense exception-under which it agrees to extradite persons accused of
particular acts never deemed justifiable. To the extent a state limits its dis-
cretion over extradition in a manner consistent with generally accepted
state practice, it is fully entitled to import that understanding of extradita-
ble criminality into the peremptory exclusion rules of Article 1(F)(b) of the
Refugee Convention.
Alternatively, states that insist on maintaining the discretion to refuse
the extradition of some persons who have been involved with violent activi-
ties will have to justify refusals of protection on the basis of the more
demanding standard set by Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.
Where the state is not concerned about avoiding the admission of a fugitive
from justice, but instead worries that a particular individual's involvement
with or facilitation of violence poses a risk to asylum-state security or
safety, refugee status must be assessed and recognized where appropriate.
Particularized expulsion or refoulement is authorized under Article 33(2) as
a last option only if the risk to the state is particularly high and due pro-
cess norms are respected.
It makes practical sense to respect the historical division of responsi-
bility between the Refugee Convention's rules on peremptory exclusion in
Article 1(F)(b) and its requirements for removal of dangerous refugees
under Article 33(2). This approach imposes a requirement of ethical sym-
metry on states, denying them the right to exclude summarily from refugee
status an asylum seeker for reasons they define as insufficiently compel-
ling to justify a refusal of extradition. States may still deny protection on
the grounds of a more broad-ranging set of safety and security concerns,
but only if a serious risk to the host state or its community is established.
Because the absence of an international supervisory mechanism means
that each state is ultimately the arbiter of its own compliance, refugee law
simply cannot afford to lose this self-regulating structure of justification.
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